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PREFACE
In 1962, the United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion in the
Regents' l'rayer case. .As a result of the decision, the Court was accused of
disregarding Constitutional principles and perverting the intentions of the
Founding Fathers by outlawing God and prayer from the public schools.
lawyer, I was disturbed by the vicious nature of the

att~eks

As a

on the Court; as

a parent, I was concerned over the divisive effect of the controversy on the
schools and the community; and, as a student, I was curious to know exactly
what the Court and the Founding Fathers said, and why.

This curiosity led me

to a study of the writings of the Constitutional period as well as the decisions of todayc
The first part of my study concerns the meaning of "religious freedomtt as
revealed through the fundamental laws of the Constitutional period.

In the

course of my research, I have compiled and noted ever.; mention of religion in
the State Constitutions and Bills of Rights drafted between 1776 and 1791.

I

have read the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation and the
Northwest Ordinance; the Debates in the Constitutional Convention, the State
Ratifying Conventions, and the First Congress, and extracted ever.; significant
mention of religion.

I have not looked behind the words to the actual prac-

tice, but rather to the words and phrases themselves, seeking different ways in
which a similar idea can be expressed, thus clarifying the meaning of that idea.
(I am concerned with what people ~ rather than what they did; the fact that

in some instances these pronouncements were honored more in the breach than in
the observance does not make them any less valid as criteria of what the people
thought the law ought to be.)
The second part of my study concerns the interpretation of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment by today's Supreme Court, particularly in relation to the schools.

I have studied the recent Supreme Court decisions; State

laws concerning religion, the public schools and the public purse; public reaction to the Court; Congressional hearings on proposed Constitutional Amendments to "put God back in the schools"; Law Review articles, and much of the now
extensive body of literature which disects, analyzes, criticizes, praises, and
vilifies the Supreme Court and its precedent-making decision.
This study would have been impossible without the hGlp and cooperation of
a great many people - my debts are many, my gratitude heartfelt.

I am espe-

cially grateful to the College-Faculty Program of the American Association of
University Women for the initial grant which made my return to academia possible; to my parents for their continued support, both moral and financial;
and to Mrs. Jacqueline Larsen who did the typing with skill and unlimited patience.

I am indebted to Dro Noble Cunningham, and to Dr. Stanley Friedelbaum

of Rutgers - the State University, in whose seminars I first became interested
in the subject matter of this study, for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions; to Dro Barry Westin, for many hours spent in reviewing assorted rough
drafts of the manuscript and for his invaluable analysis and critique; and to
my advisor, mentor, and friend, Dr. Spencer Albright, Jr., my very special

thanks, for without his inspiration and guidance, this thesis might never have
been completed.

And finally, to my husband, Stephen - chief critic and morale

booster - my eternal gratitude for his patience and understanding, and for his
encouragement of this housewife's ambitions for a second career.

v

PROLOGUE
Learned Hand, one of our most respected JUrJ.8ts. described. the Com:titution
and Bill of

Rig~ts

as the

••• altogether human expression of the w111 of the s b t.e ~cmven tions
that ratifi.ed them; •. t_h_exr meal'l1_ng: :1.!:'. to b.e _r,:a.t.h_e£.p_C!- .fro.~ ~P-~.
words they contaj._!!, read in the historical setting JI~ ~.!,.)ich they
~g_. uttttes!_~ _(Emphasis supp1 j edV"
To give meaning to the word:1 of these documents nertaimne to relie,-ion, I have
attemptP.d to collect and examine all the similar words uttered in

analagou~

circumstances by the people of the neH nation,
We are a nation that likes to haue things i:r. wrtt.ing

In the period f ron

the Declaration of Independence to thP nill of Rtghts, the hopes,

ideals~

pirations - and prejudices - of the new nation were written into law..

as-

In those

fifteen yea.rs many documentfl renremmtin,7' thr> ftmfaroen tal leH 0f thP- lanrl w0rP
drafted by the representatives of the people.

P. statute or even a c0n8titution

does not usually represent the exact views of any one person or group; however.
through compromise and discussion, through the interplay of ideas, the e.ction
and interaction of competing and diverse points of view, there is an expression
of composite opinion which does reflect the intentions
people as a whole.

~ind

aspirations of the

It is my hone that an examination of all these documents,.

together with the debates which were prolof-Ue to the adoption of the Constituti on and the Bill of Rights, might _reveal an

(~ ~; titude,

a collective opinion -

1 Learned Hand, ~ Bill of 3.ights ( Cambri<lge: ~larva.rd Press, 1958), p, ·5.

?
a

consensus, if you will - which will illuminate the meaning of ''the words they

contain" concerning religious libertyo
It is an astonishing- fact that the United States Supreme Court did not ruJ.E,

in any substantial way on the meaning of the Establishment clause of the First
Amendment until 1947,?

The

.S:.YJU:~O.!!. case3 upheld the cons ti tutionali ty of tax-

supported school b11ses for parochial school children and, for the first time,
spelled out a "wall l)f separation" between church and

st~te

bt'tsed on this

clause •. Both the majority and minority in this five-to-four decision

b~se~

their reasoning on the Virginia Statute for Relig-ious FrP.edom, Madison's Memorial and Re"lonstrance, and .Jefferson's "wall of separation" letter.
been six more

~stablishment

There have

cases decided since then; the most controversial is

4
the New York 13oard of Regents' Prayer case, Vehement

p~·otests

from all segments

of society immediately followed this decision in which the Supreme Court held

the recitation of a state-prescril>ed and state-sanctioned prayer in the public
schools unconstitutional,
Godless.

The court was accused, among other things, of being

Over 170 amendments to the Constitution have been submitted to the

House Judiciary Committee to put God .and prayer back into the schools, and to
correct the court's obvious "misinterpretation" of the intentions of the Founding t'a the rs. 5

How does the Court decide the meaning of a Statute written 175 years ago.
on a point that could not possibly have been present in the minds of the men
who draftetl.. the legislation? The probleru-·be·comes tlouL1-:-r·diffi:cu1t·when ±t
2

Robert F. Dri'!'l.an, Reliz.0.IL the . .Qourts and Public ?olicy (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1963), p.3.
?Eve.£.S..9..11 Y.! .J3EJ!!..<'L9f ];.du CJl.t.:i.oJLQf~_t.l:l.e~__T.o_wni;i)'.l_i_P_
4
. '
Engl~.Y.· .Vi.tale, 370 U.S, 4211 (1962).

1?..L· E~.zinz, ..330 U, s. L, ( 1947) •

5~ Hagazine, May 8, 1964, pp.63~4: Murray Kempton, "Vessels of Christ,"
The New Rcnublic, May 16, 1964, p.13.

3
concerns .such a .pe:rsonal, emotio!'lal, and fundamental liberty as freedom of religion •.. Every.schl)Ol boy knows that_ a hw requiring Congresrn:ien to be 5piticop;.,.li:~:1"1,

or requiring_ the teaching of. Catholic dogma in thf! publi.c schoolst or.

ma.king church attendance mandatory-would be in violation of the Consti tutim al
guarantees of freedom of religion and, consequently, void.
conf:;:ont the Court today do not permit so simple a solution.

The issues which
The status of tax-

supported buses for parochial schools, chaplains in the service academies,
Christmas ;:arols, voluntary prayers in the public schools, tax-exempti.ons for
church property, and even ".In God We
by the Court.

Truse~

have been or soon will be considered

6

There are two clauses in our fundamental be which togethe:- provide the
statutory framework for religious freedom in the United States.

The first is

contained in the Constitution in the last sentence of Article VI:
••• 1i·.:.t no religious test shall ever be required as qualification
to any office or public trust under the United Sta~es.

ar.·. :he other. Article I of the Eill of Rights:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; •. ,,

6New York Times, Nov. 14, 1964, pe49; Aug" 19, 1966, p,9E, textbooks;
Aug~··2r,- J.966, p.92, ·Vermont land use st:1tute for support of religious education; Jee. 14, 1965, p.l, voluntary recitation of nursery school prayer, ete,;
~~agazine, Sept. 3, 1965, p.68, church-run anti-poverty program.

PART

I

Chapter I
THE SOVE.l1EIGN

:;T,~ TF.S

During the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary period eleven of the thirteen original states drafted

ConstitutiOiw~

B.ilfo of Hights, or both.

documents show a curious mixture of enlightenment and fearo

These

There is, on the

on3 hand, an almost triumphant recognition of the unalienable rights of man,
and~

on the other hand, a hesitance, a reluctance, to

r~cognize

that these

rights belong to all men - particularly if these men are too different.

There

is, however, a definite spirit of toleration which pervades these documents,
though in some instances their provisions seem contradictory to us.

There was

in the minds of the good citizens considerable difference between allowing an
"infidel" the right to believe and practice his religion and allowing him to
hold an office of public trust.
conflict between "freedom of

To many Americans of that day there was no

conscience'~

and prohibition against holding office.

The Virginia Bill of Rights, which predates the Declaration of Independenc~, ~~Ls

forth the policy of that Commonwealth regarding religion in the much-

quoted Section 16.
That reli,0.on, or that duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally
entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates
of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice
0hristinn forebearance, love and charity towards each other.l

1Francis Newton Thorpe, 1'.h2, Federal w,! State Constitutions Colonial
Charters and Other Orgap1,.c 1'fil!.! (Washington, DoC.: Government Printing
Office, -ig09)
, VII, 3814. Herinafter
referred to as Thorpe.
,
.

5
Despite this~ a 1777 statute required church attendance and universal support
of the established churcho

The Anglican Church was disestablished in 1779, but

it was not until 1786 wiih. the pa.ssage of

Jefferson~s

r•an Act for Establishing

Religious Freedom" that separation of church and state was complete,
The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom is not technically within the
scope of this study since it is not part of Virginiavs Bill of Rights or Con-.
stitution.

Ho\'lever, :Lts magnificent language is quoted so often as being rep-

resentative of the attitude of the day that it deserves incluston among the
"fundamental lawso."

2

This·. statute emphatically states that "to compel a man to

fu:-nish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions he disbeliP-ves,
is sinful and tyrannicalJ' that civil rights have no dependence on religious
opinions, and that

11

to suffer the civil magistrate to tnt:rude his powers into

the field of opinion ••• is a dangerous failacy which at once destroys raligious
liberty''; and that "truth is great and will prevail if left to herself," therefore be it enacted that
no one be compelled to support or frequent any place of worship ..••
nor enforced. restrained. molested or burthened in his body or goods,
nor she.11 suffer on account of his reliyious beliefs; • o o but all men
shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain their opinion,
in the matter of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish,
enlarge or effect their civil capacities ••••
and further, that since these rights are the natural rights of mankind, any
attempt to repeal or narrow the statute would be an infringement of natural
righto3 After this statute was passed in 1786, there was no doubt as to
Virginiags position with regard to religious freedomo
Connecticut and Rhode Island, the two states which did not pass any

~...-·

....

"'--"';.

__ ____ -----·-·----·,--.,. ._..._.

2
See particul,~rly J!.V~E:).I.',S.OP. .. Y3 B.o.a.r,d. _.O,f_ J~d.'A,c,.a_t.i,OA. O.(.!_o.wnsh;i..I?. of Ewing.
330 U.S. 1 (1947), where both the majority and minority cite the Statute to
support their views.
3nenry i1toele Commager (edo)~ Documents .i:r:!. American Jlistory (New York:
Appleton-Centu~-y-Crofts, Inc,, 1949)~ p,125.

6

orgnnic laws during this periodt relied on their Chnrterso

The only mention of

:t'r.ligion jn the 1662 Connecticut Charter wa'1 a :rem~.nder to tb.e settlers of thei.r
duty to

C'?nvert the natives ''to Knowledge and Obedience of the only true GOD.

~nd the ~~rwior of Mankind, and the Christian Faith." 4 Rhode Ishnd, with its
lcmr; ~::c«dition
~66j.

of

of religious freedo!'l, had a unique provision in its royal Charter

Granted by Charles

II~

during the period of the religious wars, its

religious freedom clause was far in advance of its time - an amazing expression
of liberality and toleration:
That our royall will and pleasure is, that noe person within the
sayd colonyei at any tyme hereaftert shall bee any wise molested,
punished, disquieted, or called :tn question, for any differences
in opinione in matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb
the civHl peace of our sayd colony; but that all and everye person and persons nay from tyme to tyme and at all tymes herPafter,
J.r:e.~.ly~e. .~PA .:f.µJ.lxe Jt@.Y..~ ~I}.d, ,e.n..i_o_Y.~ _ll!ll. _?_nd ~E. 2w:~~~ _judgment§.
l£ld~ ~_qri.§~c,i..e.z:i.c..~s .• j.rJ. .11)..£1.tte,x.;"l. q.f.. .ri?J..~~~.OJ,t..§.. ..9_0.11.c.~ni~.!!.!E. ., , • and
la'i>~e. statute, or clause, therein contayned, or to be contay21ed 1
usage or custome of this realme, to the cont.rarY hereof, in 3ny
wise, notwi thstand.ing" •.• (~;'l'lphasis supplied)5
Pennsylvania's Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1776, recognized "that
all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship /1lmighty

God acc0rd:~n,c;

to the dictates of their own consciences and u".l.derstandi'1g .... 116 e.nd

t'rr:.t "-:o

authority can or ought to be vested in or assumed by any power whatsoever, that
shall in any casP- interfere with or in any manner control the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship,'~ This echops a similar
provision in the 1682 ''Frame of Government. 118 That sanie cJ!mse also states
that no man who "acknowledges the

J2!li..11!r of 1!_.Q.q,<!" .. can be deprived of any

ci·.ri:J.

0

right as a citizen because of his "peculiar" mode of religious worship,./ ana

~

.

.

-

·

-

-

no· man who is "conscientiously scrupulous'' of bearing arms shall be co'llpellet:l

.. ___ ..

_.. ,

_.___ ...

_,.,,.-..,.,, .... _.. ....-., . ..,..

A

·Thorpe, T, 534.

5Ibid.
--- ·• • .

t

6 r oi·d .,,,

_____ ... ......... -_,.........,..._
,-

.,.

__.

..._,..,

7 Ib"~

··---~·' p.3063.

VI, 321),

8 Ibid.

Vi 3082,

9Tu.:i;Q._;

-· •• -

1

p.3003.

7

to do so.

10

There was no requirement of belief in God before one might exercise
11
one's right to vote, but all non-Christians were effectively prevented fro~
holding office by the requirement that office-holders take the following oath:
I do believe ill one God, the creator and governor of the universe,
the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the wicked. And I do
acknowledge the scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given
by Divine inspiration.12
Pennsylvania drafted a second constitution in 1790 which modified this provision so that any person "who acknowledges the being of a God, and a future state
of Rewards and punishments" shall not because of his religious beliefs be disqualified for "any office or place of trust or profit under this commonwealth.1113 The 1790 Constitution also made a very important addition to the
provision regarding the rights of conscience "and that no preference shall ever
be given by law, to ar1y religious establishments or modes of worship. 1114 Thus,
in Pennsylvania by 1790 the law provided for freedom of conscience, no establiohed church, and complete civil rights for all except atheists.
The

:~ortL

Carolina Declaration of Rights of 1776, in language almost iden-

tical to tb:-.-L of Permsylvania, established the ttnatural and unalienable right
to worship 1Umighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, ,,lS
and further "That there shall be no establishment of any one religion, church
or denomination in this State in preference to any other ••• 1116 No man shall
be compelled to support any church, 17 but all persons shall be at liberty to
exercise their own mode of worship:

"Provided:

That nothing herein contained

shall be construed to exempt preachers of treasonable or seditious discourses
from legal trial and punishment. 1118 Their distrust of the clergy was further
evidenced by section XXXI which states that no clergyman could be a member of

lOibid.

l3Ibid., p.3100

16Ibid., p.2793.

11-b.d
.!...J:._., p.3082 •
12Ibid., p.3084.

14Ibid.

17Ibid.

15Ibid.., p.2788.

18Ibid.

t,he Senate~ House or Council ·~while he continues in the ex'.'lrcise of the pastoral
f

t•
.. lg
unc ion.

Th

ere were no religious qualifications for v0'..;.ng.

20

howe\'Or~

offices or places of trust in the civil department were denied those who did not
acknowledge ''the being of God or the huth of th" Protestant religion, or the
diviue :mthority either of the Old or New 'l'estaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the fref'dom anJ :mfcty of the state. 1121

The New Jersey Cons ti tutiori, pubhnhed ..July 4. l'i"/6. makes no m€'"ltion of
the Deity in its preamble,, 22-

.
23
'l"here rn no religious qualification for voting,

nor is there any religious dfoquttli1'1ca~ion few Lo:1i..l1n1! offic.e/ 4

Ifo person

within J;his colony shall ever be deprived of the 1.nestimah!e privilege of worshi.pping "Almighty God in a manner ngreeablc to the dictates of his own con-

2?6
science,'' ::> nor be required to p.'.lv titlws or taxes to mrnport any church.,
And farther '''l'hat there shall he no estahl:rnhment of any one religioufl sect in

this Province, in preference to rmy other
goes

.,2'{

'!'hut name clause. however.

to st1>.te "that no Protestant inhabitant of this Colony shall be denied

c;1

the enjoyment 0f a"ly ci,ril right: merely on account of hin raligi0u<J princi2
p1 es . . . ,. R

~ '.:'h at· a 11 1>
. ro t:,es t an t S

11· :t.

office of public trust.

i
11
Still

b""" C"P"ble
of
,. n

•i"'i.·
l ,, ng
,,

elected to any

It is interm:iting to note that this nrovision does
'l'his, coupled with a -~·urttcr

not _P.rohil:>li..l?On-Protestants from holding office,

provision that "no reJ.igious oath'' shall be required to hold office, 29 would
indicate that the peo,le of New

,7er~:Jey,,

in law if not in fact, had achieved

complete religious freedom.

The preamble of New York's Constitution, adopted April 177'7, quotcn t!le

-

....

·-~'

....

~.

_ ,.._
.......

____

191ltl-.~.·-···
~

-

20
rbid.
... ·~-21
Ibid.

..

·--'

p.2790
p.,2793.,

22
Ibid
• ; p.2594,

'

23Tb'd
.. l ..,. p,2595 .

27 Il?iq_.,_

24Ibisi_

29 .. 1 . 1

25 !bid. p.2597 .
~- ~

29

26.Thic!,

..Ll.!L.•

Ib l d .,

-

·-~·

p.2598.

9

1eclamtion of' Indopendenco in ito entirety.30 The quaUHcaUcns for votinff3l
and holding office

32 do not include reliGi'lus rentrictions" t•!"'.nistero, prencl-t-

ers, priestsr et~. are not elig1blo to hold office whtlo perfonninp, their pastoral funct.i.on.
doing..

34

33

nnd one who is scrupulou::i of benring arms is exc110ed from no

To ''guard agaj.nst that spiri tunl opprasuion and intolerance , • " thnt

have scourged mankind.'' the people of New York throngh their represP.ntatives
ordain, declare and detnrmine
tha.t the free exorcise nnd erjoyment of rclir,ious profost\ion and
worAhip, Without discriminntion :>r proferoncc Bhnll herenftnr be
allowed within this StRte to all mankind •• ,3~

This is fellowed by the fairly cor.uno•1 prov:i.oion tha.t this shall not be construe-d to oxr.use licentiouane:rn1

01'

a brcnch of the rcnce,

IJ.'he !"lolaware Constitution o• 1'{76 did

~oi;

incor1,orate n Bill of High•:n ..
fj

'i'here were only two proviuiom1 relating to rolieion in that document.'' ·.\~tint~.tt:.·~ .•

cle 29

"There oha.11 bo 1w

estnbli~hmcnt

of 1•ny one religiouo :met in

this state in preferenco to nnother o, ,.':~· 7 and thnt "no minioter of tho ~onpel
of any donomination ohnll be CErpablP. of holding civil of.f'ir:e :l.n this ntntn
while he continued

jn

th0 cixercise of hln p.(rntoral function.. 3F3

(l

I, AB, do profom1 fnith in God the ·'athor, 1mci in Jomw Cht·int Lio
only Son, and. in the Holy Ghost 1 one God, blc•Jsed for eYerrn'>ro nnri
l do 11cknowle1lg·e the Holy sc:ri rytur-:s of the Old and Nnw '.fostm::entn
to be g~.ven l>y divine 1nspi.rat:i.on.~<)
.YM.I'3

httcr. in 1792, a new

clu<led, in a rather

word~'

3412.M.··

31

35JbiJ.
-·. - ,.

I

1,.. <·c,·~ott

:; 3 Ibid.

-- '

--

~6

:;~Ibirl.

-~s

)•.~jg_.

p.2G:~6.

.!!rlQ.o 9 I,

p. ;?6 :·,7.

\tent into effect which in-

preamble, the acknowlcden:ent th11t 1'Throug}1 d:t\'ine

30[b'd
__...L•, · p ....")"2j
o •

IbJ.~·

C~Mtitution

%~-63 .

·37 Ibid. t p.566.

59

'
Ll'?.;\l·

•

"

Art"icle 22 sets

forth the following 0•1th for office holdorrn

l'.:ighteen

"

Creator according to the dictates o-i: thE'i :r. conscrnnces , ,,

,:lC

which is in effect a Hill of Rights, makes i t quite clear thn t ''al thourrh it is
the duty of all to worship the Author of the U•n.verse," "no man shall or ouGht
to be compell~d to attend any religious service" or "to contribute to any church

. . t er ••• ,.41
or min1.s

nor shall any magistrate "interfere with or in any manner

. ht s o f conscience,
'
. th e f ree exercise
.
· '
con t ro 1 , th e rig
in
o f re i igious
wars h ip, •· 42
nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious societien. denominati.ons. or modes of worship.''

4"'

.J

~1ection 2 of th<it same article does away with

the 1776 test oath in language identical to that of the United States Constitu-

llaryland,

f~ou th

Carolina, New Hampshire, and Massachu::iet ts were mor'? re-

:-. trictive in their provisions concerning religiono
of 1776 starts with a Declaration of
That as it is the duty of every
as h\:· thinks most acceptable to
Christian rel.igi.on, are equally
.!:£li.gio~ libert:t, ••:-l"Emphasis

Rights~

man to worship God in such manner
,tlim;_ a'lJ.__ E..e_r_s_o_n_~_pEo_f_~-!?.1?.iEJL t~~-
entifuc!. to trrotecti.on in .1h21!:
supplied)4'5

This is the only document drafted during
of religi.ous J iberty to Christians.
should not be compelled to

The Haryland Constitution

thi~ µ~riocl

'_;his smne

contri~ute

which restricts protection

statute~

r:,ffirrn:.; th"lt a

pcr~:o-'1

to maintain any particular place of wor-

ship, 46 but that the legislature may "in their discretion11 lay a r;eneral and
equal tax for the support of the Christian religion
vidual the choice of the particular church. 48

o". "

47

leaving to each indi-

A declaration of belief in the

Christian relidon is reouired for holding office; 49 however, ench person is
·--~·----~

............

-- .

~·-----~

--- ....·--·-··- .......

40 1b1_·
do • P·::.>c·69 ,,

~.,-.---~-·

... - ---·····•

44_l'Q.i'!o
45J_Q_:i,Q. .. p.16990

·1 ')

'+<e-b 'd

..LL·

46J~bJ..c.!,o
47Ib~-

48rb·.:i
~0

!Ll790.
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beliefs, 50 and

allowed to take the oath in accordance with his own relig!ous
there is a special concession to Quakers 9 .Mennonites,

and

Dunl<:ers~ who were

permitted to "affirm'' rather than .. swear, 1151 There were no relig:ious qualifications for votin~, but an oath or affirmation to support the state may be requested.

52

The Maryland distrust of the clergy iG evidenced by a provision -

whic:1, l'1 similar form, is still inco:rnorated in 'the Marylnnd Constitution -

which makes void the gift,

devise~

or sale of lands. goods or chattels to any

minister. r3li[ti.ous sect, etc., without the consent of the legislature.53
Although it is not within the scope of this paper, it would be intf?resting t"'
investigate bo forces in the coloninl experience of Haryland which led to
rather restrictive clauses on religion in an otherwise liberal Bill of RiP"hts.
1'hc 2outh Carol ~.na Constitutions reflect thQ a:.ibtv:i.lent feeHngs of the

ucoplc towards religious liberty,

The preamble of 1776 mentions the establish-

ment of the ;{omnn Catholicreli.gion in
Carolina'o discontent. 54

~uobec

o.n one of the causes uf

Qualifications foT' voting ar.d holding officl!! 55 are

established. ;°':' .hout mention of relieion, and the on'Jy oath
support the Constitutirm of South Carolina. 5G
detailed

religious

con::~

1

.;;.;.tion was adopted.

societ~.es

~·:outh

Toleration

rcquJ.r~d

is to

Two yearn later a new and more
WlW

erantetJ. to

0

all persons nnd

who acknowledge that the:r(' L: one God, and a future state

of rewards and punishments, and that Gnd is publically to bo

57

wc~·:~hippcd, '"

On

the one hand, "The Christian : rotestan!. religion is. hereby cc: :;titutcd ur.d tic-

clared to be the established. religion

nf this state.•·

58 On ~;Le other. hand, ''No
r.9

person shall disturb or molest any. relir_'.ious assel!lbly, ,..J

55""b'
. ..:::-2Ll . •

and "no person sh&ll

12
be obliged to pay towards the maintenance and support of religious worship that
he does not freely join in, or has voluntarily engaged to supporto 060 All officers of the state must be of the Protestant religion, 61 and no person shall be
eligible for a seat in the said Senate unless he be of the Protestant religion, 62 and no member of the clergy may hold office, 63 and ttevery free white
man, and no other person, who acknowledges the being of a God, and believes in
a future state of rewards and punishments ••• " shall qualify as an elector. 64
Still a third Constitution was ratified in 17900

The religious qualifications

for voting65 and holding office 66 were dropped~ as was the establishment clause,
but prohibition against the clergy holding office67 was retainedo

Article VIII

provided in language identical to the 1777 New York Declaration of Rights that
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profeaeion and worship,
without discrimination or preferencej shall forever hereafter be
allowed within this State to all man kind: Provided: That the liberty
of conscience o•o shall not o~• excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justif~ practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of this
Stateo 8
The New Hampshire Constitution of January, 1776, the first Constitution
framed by an American Commonwealth, was a very short document 9 apparently intended to be temporary, 69 which makes no mention of religiono

After several

attempts to draft an acceptable document, a ratifying convention finally accepted in 1784 a Constitution which included a Bill of Rights. 70 Article IV
reads:
Among the natural rights, some are in their very nature unalienable, because no equivalent can be given or received for
them. Of this kind are the RIGHTS OP CONSCIENCE.71
Article V gives every person the right to worship God according to the dictates

pe3257o

64Ib"d
__J,_o 9 po325L

68 Ibido,

Ibidc 9 p.3249.

65 Ibid., p.32580

69 Ibido, IV, 24510

Ibid., po3250.

66 Ibid.,

?Oibido 9 p.2454.

60Ibid,.,
61
62

63Ibido, p.,3253.

67

p .. 3259.

Ibid~, Po3261.

71 Ibid.

po3264o
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of his own conscience, provided he does not disturb the peace nor others in
72
their worship,
and further "that every denomination of Christians" shall be
equally under the protection of the law, "and no subordination of

any

one sect

or denomination to another shall ever be established by lawo .....7 3 The next
section aclmowledges that "morality and piety" are the best security for government and therefore empowers the legislature to authorize the towns to make provision, at their otm expense, for the support and maintenance of public
Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality.

The towns are to have

the right of selecting their own teachPrs and no one is required to support a
teacher other than of his own denomination. 74 Only Protestants shall be eligible to hold office,7 5 and the oath of office is taken, "so help me God."76
However, i.f a person be "scrupulous of swearing," - a concession to the Quakers he may omit the words ttso help me God'1 and subjoin instead, .. This I do under the
pains and penalties of Perjury. 1177
The good people of Massachusetts were the most cautious of all the
Americans in the granting of religious

liberties~

The Preamble ;o their 1780

Constitution pays tribute to the great "legislator of the Universe 1 11 and recites
in lofty tenns a Declaration of Rights:
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society publically and at stated seasons, to worship the SUPREME BEING, the
great Creator and Preserver of the Universe •••• 78
and further, that no subject shall be hurt, molested,
oo• for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to
the dictates of his own conscience ooo provided he does not disturb
the peace ••• 79

72 Ibid.

75 Ibid., po2462.

78Ibid.,

73Ibid.

76 Ibid., po2468o

79 Ibido

74 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

III, 1889.
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There are no religious qualifications for voting;SO but an office holder must
81
_profess to the Christian -re11·~1·on~
.

• concession
·
· ma de to
· Qua kers who may
is

~

"affirm" rather than swear to an oath. 82
The people of Massachusetts are also convinced that the "preservation of
Civil government depends on piety, religion and morality, ,,S3 and to that end
"the people have a right to invest the legislature'' with the power to authorize
and.require the towns to make suitable provision "for the support and Maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and mora1 i ty in an cases
where such provision shall not be made volun tar.Hy. 84
parishes do have the right to

~elect

1\ lthough

the towns and

teachers and money paid for public worship

was to be applied to the sect of their own choosing, public morality was not
left <;o cha.nee - the legislature was empowered to enjoin attendance ,. 85

On the

other hand,
• ", every rltmomination of Christians , •• shall be equally under
the protection of the law and no subordination of any one sect
over another shall ever be established by law,,86
In summarizing the situation that existed in the individual states from
the

~eclaration

of Independence to the first session of the Congress under the

new Constitution, two things must be kept in mind,
aspects to complete religious freedom:

Fir~t.

there are three

one, the right to worship (or not to

worship) in accordance with one's individual beliefs - that is, freedom of
conscience or toleration;

two. the disestablishment of a state church;

three,

the removal of any civil disabilities stemming from belief or disbelief in any
particular faith.

Second, these Constitutions do not necessarily reflect con-

.ditions as they ac:tually existed, but rather represent what the people felt

80
81
82

rbid., p.1e95,,

83 IbJQ.. ~ pnl889,

Ibid., p.1900.

84ll?id.

Ibid.

85 Ibid.
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"ought to be"; these constitutional provisions represented in many instances an
idealo
All states (with the exception of Maryland which restricted toleration to
Christians) recognized that freedom of conscience was the natural right of all
men.

There was tolerance of differences and a definite recognition of the

rights of minorities"
"swearrt in taking an

Numerous clauses permitted one to "affirm" rather than
oath~

and excused from military service those whose re-

ligion did not permit them to bear arms.

In many of these documents there are

specific statements that no man shall be compelled to support any church.
By the end of the "critical years, 1' of the eleven states which had passed

fundamental

laws~

only Massachusetts and New Hampshire restricted equal protec-

tion of the law to Christian sects and specifically reqnir<rd rublic support of
the Christian religion.

Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina and Pennsylvania

had specific ••no establishment" clauses (and Virginia had passed the Statute of
Religious Liberty), and the other states were either silent on the subject of
establishment or included a "no prefe:r""n~e clause" in their freedom of conscience clause.

By the end of this period there were no religious qualifica-

tions for voting in any of the Constitutionso

.

Almost all, however, specified

that office holders have a belief in a Deity or be Christians or, in the case
of New Hampsliire, Protestants; they were not convinced that non-Christians
were "good" people.

The people of the new nation wanted their leaders to be

religious, but they were afraid of too close an association with the clergy of
any specific denomination.

The traditional American anti-clericism is evi-

denced at this time by emphatic prohibitions in four out of the eleven Constitutions agai.nst clergymen holding offices of public trust; they wanted to
keep the church out of government and government out of the church.
Americans had come a long way in the

post-Revolu~ionary

years - from

16
persecution to tolerance. from established church to equality for nll
nor was it only the States which expressed these changes
ments.
~<;

well.

~Lr:

church~s;

their legal Jocu-

Such ideas were embodied in the fundamental documents of the new nation

Chapter II
THE NEW NATION

With the Declaration of Independence in July of 1776, the thirteen colonies took their first united step towards becoming a free, independent nation.
The members of the Philadelphia Congress, referring to

the

"laws of nature, and

nature's God," held it to be self-evident that "all rnen are created equal,"
that

~rthey

are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, 0 and

that among these rights are "life, libet>ty, and the Ptlrsuit of happiness."
There are several references to the Deity9 including an appeal to the "Supreme
Judge of the world," and an affirmation of reliance on the "protection of
Divine Providence," but no specific reference to religion.

The

Articles of

Confederation and Perpetual Union, formally adopted by Congress on November 15,

1777, assert that the severB.l states enter into a "firm league of Friendship"
for their common defense, the security of their liberties and their
mutual and general welfare; binding themselves to assist each other
against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them or.any of
them on account of religion ee• or any pretense whatevere lEmphasis
supplied)!
This is the first document of nation-wide scope which mentions religion.
time the Deity is referred to as the

11

This

Great Governor" of the world. 2

The principles that were foreshadowed, though not fully articulated, in

1Jonathan Elliott (ed.), Debates .Q!.~ State Conventions .Q.!l~ Federal

Constitution (Washington, DoC., 1836), I, 108.
Elliott.

2Ibid., p .. 113.,

hereinafter referred to as
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the Declaration of Independence were given their first national expression ten
years later.

At the very time that the Constitutional Convention was meeting,

the Congress of the Confederation passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which
establishe1 the policy for governing that territory and for the future expansion
of the United States. Even more

it guaranteed to the future inhab-

important~

itants of the territory a fi1ll bill of rights embodying
o . . the fundamental princ'Lples of civil
form the basis whereon these republics,
are erected; to fix and establish these
all laws, constitutions and governments
be formerl. •003

and religious lib~rty, which
their laws and constitutions
principles as the basis of
which forever hereafter shall

Its first Article provided that "no person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and
orderly manner shall ever be molested on account of his
gious sentiments, in the se.id territory,"

~.

m~ce

of worship or reli-

precedent of national concern for

religious freedom was established; for the first time in history free men voluntarily secured not for themselves but for others the "inalienable rights of man."
The Constitution of the United States contains only one mention of religion~

the last clause of Article VI:

"o•o

but no religious test shall ever be

required as qualification to any office or public trust under the United
States."

Th~

subject of religion was not at issue.

The first mention of reli-

gion noted in the official Journal of the Convention4 was not until August 30,
more than three months after the delegates began their deliberations.

Madison's

notes, however, 5 indicate that Charles Pinckney submitted a Plan of a Federal

3Thorpo, II1 9570
4Elliot, I, 306,,

5Henry D. -Gilpin (ed.),~ Madison Papers: His Reports .Qf. the ~tes
_in~.!~e;:_al Convention (Washington, DoCo~_ l,a?lp'tree and O'Sullivan, 1840),
II~, 74L .. (This .will hereafter b.e ci tad as. Madison Papers.) See also Max
Farrand (edo), _Records .Q!!!llt.. Feder& Convention ..Q! 1787 (New tiaven: Yale
University Press, 1911; Vol. IV, 1937), IV, 28. hereinafter referred to as
Farrand.
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r.on~ti.tuticri on May 28~

rnn.

Thi.A planp whic!1 WM quite dehlilcd~ focl~Jd(-'ct ·~

provi1don th!~t ''Tho le1dtJlntur1~ of the Onited fitateo sh.<tll

sub,ject of

religion~"

6

nn Jaw on tho

pllH'l

and ca.lled for

1

'I he Pri.wention of Religious Tests as qunUfica.tions of Offlces of

t:ru.st or Emolument ••• the last a pr;oovi.sion of the world will

expect from you, in tho establishment of a System founded on

Hepubli.can 'Principlcm~ a.nd in an age

ai:.1 the present, 7

i10

libeX'l'.l.l and enlightened

Mr. i:1lncknay added~

our true oituation 1.:mema to be thisp - a n{"w mctenoivo country conttdning idthin it.self., th~ mat,~rial::i of form.ir.g a govornment capable
of t•X temiing to itfJ cl t:iiens all the oloirningr~ of' civil and Fteligioua
l:iberly.8
Th~re

in no .record of nny debate on Hro :,''inckney 11 n 1:len.

~.'hr,

D~t;ail,

mixt mention of relig:i.on was on Auguot

20~

whc-n

~>d.ioon

"sundry propoaitions 19 concerning the poworo of Uw

eluding the

notes that

legfalature~

in-

foll.owing~

l~o

religious teat or qualification shall evor bl' nnnoxcd to e.ny
oath of of':f'ica under the authodty of the United States.

Thi.a was part of a Hat which included other personal liberties w habeas corpun,
lfb{~rt:r of the press~ subordination of the military to civilian authorityw etci, 9
6

r1~<!J:!i.2.U .P..aP..tr.~h r~. 720.

7Farrand, III. l.22, The on tire plan is quotet~ in Farrand, Illy 106ff ~
'J;'he editor notes that this pa.rt was evidontly ad.d.cd later since it is not
in keeping wHh the rest of the plan. M11dloo.n fltati;s :tn his noten that
beceusa of tho length of the paper .submitted by Mr~ Pinckney, he did not

take notes, F-nd that the oopy which is inserted in his notes wna ta.ken from
papers f'urnished to the Secre·tary of State and published in 1819. Madison
.~:!!• III, Appendix vi.
8y•11r.rand, lV, 28, · '11hiB 1.s from Mr. Pinc.1rney' a vers'ion of his own
opeach whi.oh i.s in.oludecl in the 1837 addit:i on to Mr. Farrand ns work. TJn1PS£1
more contemporary i•eporte ar.e 1H scovered~ it itt unlikely that we will ever

know how accurate thase reports are.

9!IB9 taon. iJ!P2r:!•

I Il ~ l :;66; Pa rrand » II t 342 n
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This was referred to that committee without debateo 10

On August 30th

Article 20 l-tas taken up (now Artic1 e VI dealing with the oath of officr )o

Mr. Pinckney moved to add to the Articles:

"But no

reli~ious

test shall ever

be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the nuthori ty of the United States."
11

11 Mro Sherman of Connecticut thought it unnecessary,

tr.e prevaiUng liberelity being sufficien't secur:ity ageinst such tests,1112

Mro Gouvernur Horris and General Pinckney seconded the motion, 13 and it was

pas~ed unanimousl~r •14 The wr.ole article was then apnroved with North Carolina
voting "No," and rriaryland dividedo 15

All states W·erP present that day except

New York and, of course, Rhode Island. 16
The Committee of 0tyle reported on that clause on Sepkmber

12th~

elimina-

ting the words 0 un~.er t!i.e authority of, 1117 and on S-:>ptember 17, 1787, the fin'l1
draft showed no further change.

18

Religion, as such, was not mentioned again"

There was, however. a brief

diGcussion on the inclusion of a Bill of Rightso

On SeptembPr 12th, ?fr. El-

bridge Gerry of Massachusetts urged the n·:cessi ty of jury trials to guard
against corrupt judges. 19

::clonel Mason perceived the difficulty and

--------~~~--~v-.......--

11

Nad_i_~ Pa.J22.!:~• III, 1468: fa-r.. ·amlt II. 468; r:lliot, I, _::Y,.

12Ib~.
17.

:.>r-raa is on Papers III., 1468; Farrand, II, 4,:;fl.

14E11iot. I, 3or:.
15~~ ?ape:r~, III, 1468; F'fl.r'.'.'and, II, 468.
16

~lliot 1 I, 306.

17Madison ?"ners, III, 1543; Farr3.nd, II, 579. 603~

Hudi'.':._O.!l.I:s:1.~rs, III~ 1622; r'arrand., II~ 663.

18

19r.Iadi'3on Papers, III 1565 •
9

21
wished the plan ha<l been prefaced with ~: bill of Rights and would
secor.d a rr.otion i f made for that purpose. It would eive great
atdet to the people; .:1nd with the aid of the :ltates Declarations
a Bill might be prepa:red in a few hours.20
Gerry commrred in the idea and moved for a Cammi ttee to prepare
Eieht:=i; the motion was seconded by Colonel Mason.

11

Bill of

The only recorded debate

on this motion consists of a statement by Mr. Sherman that he "was for securing the rights of the people where requisite, 0 but that "the State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution, and being in force arc
sufficient." Mas::m answered that the laws of the United States are paramO'l:.nt
to ~tate Bills of Rights.

21

The official Journal of the Convention indicates

that this was defeated unanimously, 10 no, 0 aye.

22

However, Madison's notes

indicate 5 in fav•Jr - New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 11nd
Delaware - and 5 against - Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Rnd Georgia, ~!J.t'ri ~'l«!Ssachusetts listed as absent. 23
f,'ate from Massachusetts was present, one wonders if
stain" instead of R.bsent.)

(Since at least one de leMarii~'ln

didr.'t mean "ab-

The North-South division in the voting brings to

mind the statement of General

Pin~kney

in the South Carolir..a Convention.

Tt

is nlso interesting to note that the three men who did not sign the Constitut:i.cn, 1'11.son, Gerry, a11d Ra.ndoJ:oh, were proponents of e Bill of R:\.ght.s from

:;tates which did n<'t sup})ort a Bill of Rights.
On September 14 Mr. Ha.dison and Mr. Pinckney moved to include in the
powers of Congress the power to establish a university in which "no
or Mstinction should ho allowed on account of religion. 1124

-----M-----·---·-----201.!?.11.•
21

Jhid.

22r.1Eot, I, 336; Farrard, n, 582.

P'.'l.per~. III, J 565 •

23
Mi:i.dison
24Farrand

9

II, 616; Ii_a~ f.a net>s, II , 740'

preferenc~

l; ,'. {/il sori

22
supported the motion but Mro Morris felt such a power was not necessary because of

Congress~s

exclusive power at the Seat of Governmento

The motion was

defeated 6 to 4 with one dividedo 25 There was no further discussion concerning
religion, and the completed Constitution containing only one reference to religion was submitted by Congress for transmittal to the States.

A letter from James Madison to George WashingtQn, dated September 30,
1787, 26 indicates that Richard Henry Lee proposed the addition of a Bill of
Rights to the Constitution before it should go forth from the Convention to
Congress.

In this action he was supported by

Rights was to contain provisions for

11

f.~ela.ncthon

Smith.

The Bill of

trial by juries in civil cases, and

several other things corresponding with the ideas of Colonel Mason." 27 (Presumably, this would have included provisions concerning religious liberty.)
It was contended that the Confederation Congress had an undoubted right to insert amendments, and that "it was their duty to make use of it in a case where
the. essential guards of liberty had been omittedo"

The principal argument

against the addition of a Bill of Rights at this point was that any action of
the Congress would have to be addressed to the legislatures of the various
states and not to the conventions, and that, therefore, being addressed to
the legislatures under the Articles would require unanimous consent.

The

matter was therefore dropped.
There was considerable unanimity of opinion at the Constitutional Convention that the Federal government as a_goverrunent of delegated powers had no
authority in the matter of

reli~ious

li.berty, that this was a concern of the

25Farrand, II, 616; Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
Georgia, no; Connecticut, dividedo

26Madison Papers, II, 643-45.
27Ibid.

ste.tes.

The Confederation government did have au'"hority over the goverrmnrt

of territories and anticipated the action of
by providing a full Bill of Rights for the
the various state Billso

th~

state ratifying canvP.ntior..s

No~thwest

Territory patterned on

It is logical to assume thrt the Confederation

~on

gress was gra"lting t:o future states those same "inalienable rightfl o:" man"
which were already recoenized by the existing states.
fls was pointed out previously, the hst step to complete religious
dom is the removal o" civil <lisabilities because of rPligious beliefs<

fr~e

That

no ''religious test shall be required" by the Constitution \-tas accepted without debate, almost as a matter of courseo

Chapter I!I

WE THP PEOPLE
The Federal Constitution as submitted to the states contained only one
clause pertaining to religion .. itno religious test shall bo required to hold
an office of trust under the United States, 11 There was conc()rn in the state
conventions because there was no Bill of Rights to protect newly won freedoms,
among them, the freedom of conscience. One gets the impression that the religious problem had already been settled on the state levrl, and that in the disoussions of the Rights of Man, freedom of religion waa added almost as an
, afterthought. The convention delegates were far more conco-rned with the tra·
di tionnl "rights of Englishmen," the "legnl" safegiiards such as trial be ,jury.
right of habeas corpus, proteot:J..on again'3t unraaaonable searches and

sei~mree t

etc. 1 ·

The record.a of the ratifying conventions s.ppear far from complete; yet it
is clear from those we have that debates regarding any aspect of religious
freedom occupied a very sm9.ll portion of the time spent in dioouosing the
Constitution. The Delaware Convention, which ratified first and unanimously,
left neither a record of its debates nor any suggestions for amend.ments. 2

------.......................... _
_,

_...

____

Jackson Turner Main, in his .An~.1-Federali eta 1 . Cr1 tics .9.t the Constitµti2n
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961 , confirms this view.
"Generally ratification conventions that drafted Bills of Rights included religious freedom as a matter of course, but other amendments seemed far more
important." Religious freedom "was least mentioned apparently because there
was nothing in the Constitution that threatened it and no special safeguards
were deemed necessary," PP• 158-59.
1

2re111ot, I, 349.

25
Georgia, less thnn a n.onth later, also ratified unanimo'-lsly 1 and without quali. t":.'.0'1, 3
f ica

New .J ersey / too, accepted the Constitution without qw:1lificl'-tion,

leaving no rP.cord cf any d'3bates which may hav9 taken placeo
the laPt sta-!:e to ratify the Constituti0n, si1111arly lert

~o

.1

Rhode Island,
record of its de-

bates but J.eft no dcubt as to its position in regard to religion.
a".llendments prop0serl by Hhode Islanc \-'as

on~

the.t provided that a

Among the
perf'o·~

reli-

giously scrupulous of bearing anns ought t0 be exempt uron the paymerit of an
equiwlent 5 and
IV. Tb.at :.-eJigion, o:r the du7.y which we 011<'e to our r.reator, a:-i.d
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only be reason and
conviction, and not ·by 1-:0.r-ce and violence, and therefore, all men
have a natural 9 equal, and unalienable right to the exercise of
religion, RC~ording to tte dictates of cons~iP.nce, and that 10
particular re:!.ig:l ou'1 sect or sori.C,ty 0ught to be favored or
establi~hed, by law, in prefe~ence to others-6

The only speech preserved from thf' Tllew Hampshire convention dealt e··_clusively
with the slrwe.ry questi0n

The NN• Hampshire convention did 1-i.0w8ve:r s:1l:mi t

several amendr:ients, including
Congress shall rn9ke no laws toucring religion or to iYJ.fringe
.
'
7
th e rights
o f'. ccn8ci.ence.

XI.

The records of +.he ?faryl<ln:J C'Onwmtton

lll''e

conve:::ition wa::. e.ppointed to pre::are a liGt of

not cleare

a'-!erH.lmcnt~

A comrdttee l"f tbe

to the :.or.sti tution,..

".'hat com'!littee apparently fee.red that state Bills of 1Ughts and Cons ti ~uti.cns
might be repealed by CongreGSo

They submitted twelve amend.me-its tn the co'1ven-

tion for consideration, the first that Congres3 shall have no power other tban
that expressly delegated to it.
reli~ion

established by

l~w;

8

An amendment "thl'.t therf' shall be no national

but that all

pe~sons

be equally entitled to protec-

ti.cm in their religious liberty" was subnii tted to ':he committee but re,iected by

3Tb•d
LL•• p.355.

4Ibid.,

p.351.

5-"b.

l

~.•ti

,0

rb· -l
.:.-!S•

p~370~

7Tb·a
p.358.
~!),;
8

Ibid., TT

..Jo. ..L )

509 •
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it.

9 Haryland ratified the Constitution but rejected the arnenrJ.rr.ents proposed

by its committee.

10

They were obviously not influenced by a letter from Luther

Hartin giving his views on the Const] tution, 11

r•Je.rtin, Attorney G1meral of

Maryland and delegate to the Conntitutional Convention in

Phil,'ldelp:!'li<i~

many objections to the Constitution including the lack of a Bill of

hRri

RiRht~c

One can't be sure whether the following comment is sincere or sarcastic:

The part of the system which provides that no relieious test shall
ever be requirr:-c1 as a qualification to any office or public trust
under the Unit~d Sb.tes was adopted by a great majority of the
Co::iventioL, a~d without much de't:ate; however~ th'.)re were snme
members so unfoshion8.ble as to thrnk that a belief in thP. exist <>"Jr-e of a Deity and. of a state of future rewards Pnd p•m~_s.hm~nts
would be somA security for the good conduct of our rulers ••• and
thnt distinctinn between the nrofessors of C~rlstianity and downright infidelity or paganism.12

Connecticut, too, ratified ur;conditionallyo 13 The only mention of religion in tli.e Connecticut debates is i'1 answer to

.11

question regarding the oath.

'I'he Ikm. Olivsr Wolcott replied as follows:

T do not see the necessity of such a test:, as some gPntlemon wish for •
.,. • For myself, I should be content either i-: '.th or without the clause
in the constitution which excludes test J a111;:;. Knowledge and liberty
<ire sc prevP.1ent in this countr,r that I do not believe that the United
States would ever be disponed to estah1i:h one religi0us sect and lay
all others under Jegal disabHitier;) 4

,

'~

!ie cldecl trnt 1my such test '•l'OUld be: in->urirn:.s to the rigi1t<: oi.' free ci":izcns ;.,
and that it would n0t be "eltogether superiluous to have r,dded a clause which

secures us fr-:>m the possibilityir of being deprived of those rights.
New Yo:!'.'k su'tmitted proposed a:nendrr.E>nts tc th?.

Constitution~

16

incluilinf,' a

.<c:tnterr:ent thE'.t

the

!'eopl~

:t)r;.':C·~D b \y

9 .... "d

LRL

10,b"d

11
•

hrwe .'.'n equal, natural :->nd unali.enable ric;ht freely and
to C?J'Y'C"he t11ei r relir~iJn acr:-0rdin'=' tr: t:b~ di-:-ta.tcs of

419.

p.512

..t.-L.' J.

13 Ib1' d-

-.:49 •
- 9 !l•./

381~

u.....:'arran d , ..r-r
1 -~

172-.

J i:;'Tb 'd

_!.:_·

l6llii·

27
com:~ience~

and that no religi.0·1s sc.:::t or scc-iety ought b

be

f:1v0re'l (T est::blinhed l>y law in pi:·?ferencP t;o ot11cr:- .,

The subject o: religion was not o":he:rwice rr.t:n ti.oncd in the

~ourse of

the d~ba tes

which take almost 200 pages to report?
In Penn:.>ylvania the burden of defending thc- "onsti tu+1on fP-ll on .Ta.mes
';l:Uso.:. the only member of the ?hiladelphia convention who wan 1.lso a member of'
the r11tifying convention,

Although the debates in ?ennsyJvania were faidy ex-

tensive, there was only one specific menhon of r&Jigion,
raised,

almo~1t

science."

The question was

in passing, that there 1·:nn ''no Gecurity fo-:-- :-ignt::::: of con-

17 Wilson r£>sponded with another question!

"' aak this honorable

gentleman, what p'.lrt of this syntem puts it in the power of Conr,ress to attack
those rights? 1•

'
19
t 1_rnes.}

18

The omission of n Bill of :::ightn was questioned several

In each casP. the answer was the same;

A -;?reposition to adoi;t. a men.sure, 'that would have supposed tha1 we
we:·e tli.rowing intn thr::; genPrnl co.rArnP'rnt, eve."'Y power not expressly
reserved by the people \Wuld have bee!' ~:n:urned at iri that house •
. • , In a govern!Ilent of enu!ller=1 ted r:;o·,;ers fi t7 would not only be
unnecessary but preposterous and d~neerou;.::o
One can almost feel the ter oers

""j

sing xh:::n

}.!' ,,

~ti)

::on snys ~

If the minor:'. ty f\~0 c~::m•J:m:1u1r_: for t:ht"I :-i;:"'ts of manl'in-l, whnt then
are the majon ty contending for? ".,. the rr.ajor:. ty must be conternhng

Al though the Pennsylvanians accepted the Cons ti tu ti or. wi trout
mn.rts, the delegates apuoi1•e-:
11

j_n

order to remed;v

::t

appe1:din~

amend-

cyr,nittee to deliberate and nropose arnendm'1nts

the~e inr:on'·~n)

enc'3s and to ['Vert a nprehended <'tanr;er. '1

That co'I!Ill5.ttee's recommerdetions included nro".risions regardtng the poll tax.

standing armies, selection of 2enator:,; and that ''every reserve of the rights of
individuals~

made by the several constitutions of

shall rem'3.in

inviolable~

17~'b·n
.!.....!...;. • ,

18-h.a
2-.....L.•

p.425 •

1·r·<:1

states in th1: union

except insofar as they are expressly O•• yielded ••o "22

19T"bJ'd~

0 ';)

ppo408g 426, 49L

?Oib'cl
, _ _Lor p.4080

21

Ibido, pQL'60 ..

22TM~~~'

Pe50~.,

?8
Re1j gion is rot srecific~lly mentioned,
ti on of the ''rights of mann

=

There

1s

ocvfou91y a general recogni-

the oniy prl"lbJ e'TI ··m:· to h.,ep the central gC'vern-

ment from inte:rfering•
In 1fansachusetts. es migh~ l::e exy,-ected

f!'O!Tl

a :-~ndJnf: of her constitutjon,

there 1-mre several delegates who objer:ted to the "no rC>ligious test'' clause of
the r:onsti tuti0n,

TJ.ic most able r3efenders of thn t C'~ c,u~e wer~ mf':n'hers of the

r.:'h~ Hon, Hr.

clergy.

r5foeletry thought that mr:n in nowcr :::iho1~ld have some re-

ligion, preferably Christian. "yet by the Cons ti tut:l on a ~:a pint or an infidel

''?
were as eligible as they."<-·

~)e.veral other" urged thnt the c1ause was a "de-

partur<;> frorri the P''.nciples of 0ur forefather;": who Cll'T,e fey- the prAD0rvaU.on
,

<

•

,,2t1~

o f re ,ig~.on. ·
the

Con~titution W?~;

~10n

could not. bfJ a good man

tl-e ab;ocnce of a religious

strongest statement on

thi~3

jection.s were very ably

b~;L

:;e ''thought that a per-

~
n25
being a good rndL...,...,·1:-.'""' tian.

;,;i thout

'l'his w:w the

subject m.'.lde in any of the convenUon:::::.

'}:1swere:~,

''.'he2e ob-

'J'hs ::ev" ·:r, ';hutc eave a long dissertation

on the merits of the clau:;e and the merits of all relit;ion!J, and concluded by

saying,
There are worthy men in 1111 denominrttions - , •. evPn 11mon.c; those who
:inve no other guide in the >my of v:Lrtm) awl heaven th::m th2 6ictates
of nabral re1ig;on"26
and that the inc1union of such a test would be of no advantRge since the un-

scrupulous would not hesitate to take the oath, only the honest uo1 1lc be exeluded.

"'l'he exclusion of religious

f ore appears c 1 ear1y, t o

me~

t~st

in the proposed conn ti tuttcn the re-

.
t o be ,.·n fa"OT"
~ ; . i n... n 2 7
sir,,
• ~ o -"_ ,._,
1....•
, ,H~opc,..o

'Ihi:?

Env, iYlr. ?ayson of Suffolk County added that a relicionf; test would be a

"blemif:'h on the instrument" fo,._. ''God alone is the G::.d of tha

2 '1Jb' 1

- . 1L·· poU2

p.131.

conscienct.~,"

a--:d

attempts to "erect hunum tribunals for the conscient>es of men are irr.pious encroachm.mts upon the prerogn.ti ves of Godo' 28

fhortly before U·,e convention was

to adjourn? the Hev .. Mr. Backus asked leave to give his thoughts on the exclusion of a religious test.

His defense of this clause was most thoughtful and

well-reasoned.
I.:any appear to be concerned about it; but nothing is more evir1.er.t
both in reason, and in the holy scriptures~ than th11t religion is
ever a matter between God and individuals; and ther~fore, no man or
men can impose any religious test without invaciing the essential
prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ ••• o t,nd let the history of
all nations be searched from that day to this, and i t will appear
that the imposing of religious test:J hath .been the greatest engine
of tyranr.y in the world., And l rejoicri to see >o many gentlemen,
who are now giving fo their rights of conscience, in thiis great
and important matter. Some serious minds discover a concr~n lest,
if all religious tests should be excluded, the Congress wc·1Jld hnreafter establish Papery or son:.e other ty.rnnnica.l way of war.ship. But
it is most certain, that no such way of worshir; cE,.n b·:: est .'lblL:ihed
wi thO'l t any relig: ous test. c9
'l'·he people of Massachusetts, ''acknowledging with grateful hea"'ts, the goodness

of tho Supreme Ruler of the Uni•rerse, " 3o ratified the Condi tut ion wi.'thout
further mention of religion.

'J'hey submitted severa] amendments includinr;

amounts involved in jury t".'ials, taxation; representation, rese,..vations of
31
.
).ving
.
. .
powers, bu +, none invo
re ,... igion.

In the South Carolina legislature, which unanimously agreed to call a
convention to consider the Constitution, a Mr.

''Why was th:is

not ushered in with the bill of rights'"' "Are the people to have

~onstitution

no rights? 1'3

L~.ncoln inquired~

2

General Charles Coatsworth Pinckney gave the familiar answer th,,!;

in a government of delegated powers it would not be necessa7, then submitted
an additional reason for not including a Bill of Rights - the reason, no doubt,
that South Carolina did not support the motion for a Bill of Rights in the
Constitutional Convention.

28
,Jbid. ~ p.128.

29Ibid,f p.156.

32 r· . d
7
.:..JU_o ~ P• 'J 01 •

ti.nother reason weighed heavily with men of tMs ;.>hter such bilJs
usually begin wHh a declaration that all men e<.re hy r ature free,
now we should malt:e that decl9.ration with 11 very bF.,d gra::'e, 11hen
a large part of our property consists in men who are actually
born slaves • .53
The debates in South Carolina were -:"lot narticull=trly utimulating: religion was
mentioned only twice, once in passing, 54 and once when filro Charlos Pinckney, in
what appears to be an attflmpt i:o forestalJ arguments 9 embarked
of -political theory.

o~

a discussion

Referring to England he said,

even the government I have alluded to" withholds,, from a part of
its subjects, the equal enjoyment of their rel j gi ous l i be rtien . .
Fow many thousands of the suh,v•f!ts of <;reat Bri ta:i.n, at this momPnt.
Jabor under ciY:U disabiliti~n, merely on ac-.::ount of' their" religious
p9rsuasions ! 'I'o the liberal and enliehtened mind; the rest of F~urope
affords a melan0holy picture of the dep:riivity o:' human nature, and of
th9 tobl subver~.i on of those rights 9 without which W(" should suppose
no people should. be haopy ')r content.35
Despite iVIr. ?inckney 1' s

di~1cussion 9

the

:~outh

Car-olinians iqrnended several

resolutions to their ra+.ifj cation, including one

\;htc~l ~;tated

that the third

section of the sixth Articlg ought. to be amended by insert: mg the word ''other''
between the words ''no'' and "religion," making that section read, ''no other
religiom~

test shall ever be required ar'

trust 1mdor the constitutiono 1•

36

The

to apply their own religions tccii to
only state to so indicate.

77

riu~lification

to any c;Cfice or

publi~

·~outh

Carolinians would have pref.Jrred

~'ederal

as well as state offi cos - the

(It is interesting to note that only two yeGrs

later their ;)tate Constitu":ion eliminated religious qualifir:ati0n for hcldine
office.)
--------~--.--.----

33,rb • .l
.

~··

rv.

301.

Elli of~!!.§. and lJ:lf!! It Ii:eans Today,(Norman: Uo of Okla ..
Press, 1957), p.20~ ~·:award Dumbauld states "'This refinement of logic would
have recognized the taking of the oath as a religious test rather than as
a mere solemnity imposing an obligation under public law.,. Fe refers t0
this as "meticulous reasoning'' on the part of the delegates. overlooking
the fact t11at South Carolina already required a religious test.
37rn The

31

One of the major objections of the Virginia delegates was the absence of a

· an d again,
· 3B P1.J.trick P:enry conB1'll o f R"
nght So Th"
· is th eme wa"3 repea t e·d again
ducted a one-man filibuster in

propo~ing

the addition of a Pill of Rights.

In

his usual dramatic style he stated "it is radical in this trc-.nsi ti on, o·rr
rights and privileges are endangeredo

eoo

The rights of conscience, trial by

.
l 1"b ert y of th e press ,, • , are re.,.. d E>re d 1n
. ..,.., ecure,
.
Jury,

o , •

o39

His mention of

religion was always as one of several rights which needed to be protected.

He

ap,P'3ared far more concerned with the many ''legal and p1'.'ocedural" safeguards.
Preedom of religion under the Constitution was ably and eloquently defended by
Randolph. by Madisonv by 1nnes,. and by a !'1r0 Zachariah Johnson.

Edmund Handolph

said that he previously objr;cted to the Cons+;itution,. but that he was convinced
that since no religious test was reauired ~ no express
given to the Federal Government;

therefore~

~;o;-1er

over relie:i on was

afl a government of enumerated powers,

it could not interfere in that areao 40
l<'urther,
The variety of sects which abound i~ the United States is the
best security for freedom of religion. No part of the constitution even if strictly construed!, will justify a conclu~jon.
thi:i. t the general !$Overnmer ". can take a'rmy or impai ".' the free·
iom of religion.4.l
Mr. ?:achariah Johnson of Augusta County, i'1 an exceller.t defense of the whole
Constitution, pointed out that the vastness of the country, the ii··ersity of
opinion and varfoty of sects :in the United States wo .Jld make it difficult to
1

establish a

re~.igion,

and that anyonP, who attempted to do so would be i•univer-

~ t e d •" 42
sa 11y d e t.es t ed an d oppose d an d easi'l y f rus•ra

~fadiMn,

fashion defended thP. Constitution on this mattero 43 fut it
to call attention to the contradictory argume'1ts of the

38

Tho~~~

39

II!, 72~ 162,

Ibid. ·' p.72o

47~

. .}.L 9

4119 311.

wa~

too, in his able
left to Mr. Innes

anu-~·euerahsts

on the

40 rh d
.::..:L• v p. 0 07,

42
. _
_
1, ...) p.581.
I11"d

41

43 n10_., lTI, 313,.

.Ibid" 9 p.431.

3?
r-atte:r of religion.
Can i t be mtid that liberty of corwcience 1s in dan~r? I obse"."ve
on the side of the Constitution~ those who have been champions of
religious liberty, an attack on which 1 would as soon resist~ as
one on civil liberty, Do they employ consistent arguments to show
i t ic in danger? They inform you that Tu.,.ks, Jews, Infidels~
Christians, and all other sects, may be presiden~s and command
the fleet and army. there being no test requiredo And yet the
tyrannical and inquisitorial Congress will ask me as a private
citizen, what is my opinion on religion, and punish me if it does
not conform to theirs. I cannot think tbe gentleman could be
serious when he made these repugnP.nt and incompatible objoctions,44
'fl-1e main debates in Vi -rginfa centered around the question of whether or not

r11tification should be made conditional on t:t:e qcceptance of certajn amendments" or whether the Constitution should be ratified and amendments recnmmen)Pd.
'1

The proponents of unc".>nditional ratif:'..C"ation won out iri Virginia, 11.nd

committee was appointed to submit recommendations fcir amendrr:ents.

c;ommi ttec' s rAport, whicr was arbpted hy the
T;eclarRtion of Rights, a Bill of
tional amP.ndments to the

Rir:htf~

~or>vention, 46

45

That

inclurled th!' Virginia

with twenty provisions and twenty addi-

Con~titutio1 itself. 47 'fhe ''Wh~reas'' clause of that

i:-eport made it quite clear that the

po~.,ers gr~nted

ti.on were the gift of the neo:ole, and. that

e~rnry

undAr the proposed Gonstitu-

uower not t;ranted remained with

the people;
therefore no right of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged,
restrained or modified~ by the Congress, by the :fonate. or the
House of Hepresentati·res acting in any capacity, r;y the l'.lresidert
or any department, Ot' offi0ffr of the Uni tf'd States. e::<cept i.n
those instances on which pow'3r i8 give11 by the constitutio11 for
those purposes; and that a:nong o~her esP-ential ,..ir;hts., the liberty of conscience, And of the press cann0t b8 can0ellP.d , •• by
any authority of the United States.48

44 Ibidw, p.573. The gentleman referred to is PatriC1{ H~nry and is a:;
obvious reference to the fact that the proponentfl of the Constitution were
also proponents in thn struggle to pass the Virginia 3tatute of Religfous
J,iberty, which Henry opposed.
45

Ibid." p.587.

4n~h"d
=-.!_·

47 Ib:id.
48

Tb':! do ~ I , 360.

·;·here was /

ho~·1ever,

religions freedom.

no f"pecific clause in the cody of amendr;:ents concerning
The debates in Vi rgu1rn are considered by historians "•.rd

scholars to be the most complete

~md

thorough of

~hose

in any state; a whole

volt'.Ine of f]lliot." s i·3 required to t'ecord the proceedings"

re] i{:"ion wr:>.s debated only briefly on three different
viously not

~

Yet the s11b,jrct of

o~casions..

~-TP.S

It

ob-

major issue.

In North Carolina. on the other· hanc 9 U:ere 1·:as a more thorough and sometimes fantastic diSCiASSion of the 2u.1:jec t of religion..
considered clause by claus2., ;·;hen \;he la'c

Er, Henry Abbot summed

U!'

~he

q1..<e:•t:.or.;}

1!1

are concerned that they wo,. . H be deprived

The Cons ti tu tion was

e;ls.n:::e of

J-r~.. icle

the mind.J

or

o::..~

6 waG introduced,

tte delegctes.

49

"some

w')rshippine God according to their

consciences'' ar.d wished to knol-; if the "general gover:w:cnt can make laws in-

ro

fringing on their religious libe!:ties :·:::

Others fearG>d thut under the t-reaty;;:i·

makine power Roman Catholicism cou}d be

adopted;"~

Sti..11 others wnr.ted to know

which religion would b~ establi~'hed ('fr. •".bbot says that r~ himself is agai'1st
•
exclusive
establish men t, bu':". Lf' tr.ere were any,

·

I' T1.

"
woul.d nrn f i: !' t 1ne

And the major objectior: s"?e::r.ed to be that the eYc1us1on of '.-;;:::sts
• •
and dangerous - ''p'.3.ga:'1s., deists <lrn'. Tfohmr.etans ••· mignt
obtri:. n

, 54
Mr. Abbot also wontlered whn.t form of oath wo1tld be useo..
oug'1t to be suspicious of our

libertie~.

f~

o~

"
.w'

:12.s
.

fJ.c:e;

2
p::.' scopa~1 11 ) . 5

'n:poli +:ic

53

H;-; con-:::J.udedj "We

We have felt the effects of oppres-

sive meA.sures, and know the happy consequence of bejnr; ,jealou,; of our ri.f"hts.
Could I cor..ceive that such objections are well founded, I would decli:i.re my
opinio!l against .. ''

It is difficult, it n0t irr:possible. to evaluate the writte,...

word 200 years after the fact; however, there· is a naivete >b1ut
speech which leads one to believe that he

_., IV, 1°5,

'VlaS

5l~b'rl

53 Ibid8

50

52 Ibid,

54

rtid.

Abbot's

sincerely seeking explanati0ns.

49 Ibid

L~.·

:.rr.

__

Ibid. , p.199,

34
that he really wanted to knou what effect this new Constitution would have on
religious

liberties~

Governor Johnson expresse~ astonis~ment th~t the people were alar~ed on the
subject of religio"'l.

"This m•,ist have arisen from the great pains which had been

taken to prejudice men's minds aeainf~ the constitution."55

~r. James Iredell

(who :i.s Jatr.1'.' appointed to the Supreme Cou!'t) answet'ed Ifr. Abbot, point by

point.

''I consider thiE' c~.ause under consideration as O!'e of the stron~nt

proof3 that ::.t wafl the intention of those who f'ormeil the systcw, to establish
a general religi.ous lil::e:nty in Amer~.ca~''
an 0.'1th is required fo'.".' holding office
the rite."

56

He caller '3.+.tention to England where
which he said ''delrrndes and profanes

"7.s ther'3 any power given to ':ongreS'.s in matt.rrs of

He answerea his own question and wert

011

r~ligion?"57

to say, ••r'lppily; no sect is superior

to t?.nother" and that as long as thi.s is the

case~

we shall be free from tYio::>P.

persecution~ and distraction v•i.th which oi:her countries have been ~orn.5 8 As
for the contention thRt our

repre~entati·res

would have no religi.oni he as1<:ed,

••rs it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away tha'.; principle

of religious freedom which we ourselves so warrrly content for? .... It would be
happy for mankind if religion was permitted to b.ke l.ts ovm course 1 and ma.in-

i:;-9
tain itself by the excellence of its mm uoctrines, H .J
Kc. Iredell told the assembled delegates that he came across a pamphlet

contending that the Pope in R.o!ne could be elected ::?resident.

One can almost

hear the scorn ir. his voice whon he reminds his hearers thRt under the Constitt,_tior. +.his would '>e irr.pcss::.blo- - the Tope C':lu1dn 't meet the rP.sidence require-

ments!GO

As to the question regarding the fo::-m of the oath - simple enough;

-------------------·------,-·~-

55Ibid., p.200.
56Ibid.,. p.196.

5?Ibi~.t p.197.

35
the oath )'rllfould be administered in the form which would b1nd his conscience
61
most" and this would be determined by the beliefs of the individual taking
62
the oatho
Governor Johnson picked up the case for the defense of the Constitution and said that there are only two instances in which a non-Christian can
be elected to office:

firstp if the people themselves set aside the Christian

religion, they w.ill elect one who thinks as they do' and second 9 if a person,
notwithstanding his religion gets the esteem and confidence of the people by
hie good conduct and virtueo 63 As to the establishment of a religion, he felt
it would be impossible in thi9 country because of the diversity of sects; to
illustrate this point he liAted the states and the various religions prevalent
in each oneo 64

A Mro '":pencer diacussinrr the oath said that a test oath does not exclude
men of bad character because they would not hesitate to take the oathp "But in
this case as there is not a

religio~.1s

solid foundation of its

inherent validity without any connection with

'ltm

test required 9 i t leaves religion on the

tempera!. authority und no ki.nd of oppression can take place." 6 5 Mr. Wilson and
Mr. Lancaster66 co11tinued to object to the lack of a religious test oa.tho

The

latter presented the most logical caae for the oppositiono

As to the religious testp had the article which excluded it, provided that none but what had.been in the states heretofore, I would
not have objected to ito It would secure religion. Religious
liJ?Nl.x ...Q..~l.ll....i<l ..9.£...NOVided .!Q.!:. • •• I did not r.uppose that the
pope could occupy the president 1 s chair. But let u~ remember that
we form a government for millions not yet in existence. I have not
the art of divinationo ooo This is most certain, that papists may
occupy that chair and ·mahometans may take ito ~.!.§.A disqualification I believe in evett state in the union - it ought to be so in
~ s;ystem. (Emphasis supplied")Sl
- - - ·---·-------·~-----------".

61 Ib'd Po200o
--1-••
62Ibido

63rbid.

___. ..... P

64 Illio

po?Ol.

65lbi.d.., p

po202o

66 Ibid. p p.2120

67Ibidoi p.215. see aloo similar expression in South Carolina.w p.30, herein.

It is int,Jrosting and pedlB.p3 s.igni.ficant that thia was tho onJy time in the

1·ecorde1 deba.ton U1at this suggestion was ma.de - a very logic.:a.1 one for those
who were concerned not only about the "papista and mahometans" but also about

the role of the $ta.tes in the new government.
There was considori:(ble debate in North Carol ino» as in Virginia, as to
whether the Constitu.tion chould be accepted immcdillhly or after the addition

of amendments.
North

Iredell sur,gested that H be ratiffod i.mmJdb.te1y so the.t

Ot~r·oU•m

cl'!J.egates '!Ould participate in the first Congress and have a

'9
hanri in the drafting of the Bill of Hight~. r,
~

Willif'! .Jones, one of the leadt'r:1

of' lhfl opposition, quoted a letter from Jefferson to !·!adiaon stating that he
(1foff'orson) wanted nine state1..~ to r,1t:1Sy in order to pr.::sorve tl'!G union, Emd

th~ :)there to rejoct so that there might ho ~ertdnty of amcndmanta. 69 To
.hal p aol vo thin problem, a comroit;tee

The report of tha!; oomnit:tee,

Wfrn

e·1h~red

tippointect to submit .qmen1m::nta.

70

on the journal prior to a vote on +he

Constitution itsa1f, begtJ.n 1
].gs.Qly_!!fl~

That a d~olaraHon of rights asserting and Mcuring
frorr encroachment thr.> great principles of civi.1 and religious
liberty tin~ the unal:!.enable rights of +he peopln oup,-ht to be
la.id he!'ore Conr,reaa , •• , 71

ments to the Constitution itself. Tha twentieth section of the Declaration of
Rights wan lii'tml verbRtim from tho 17'76 \:ira.i.nia 1>9ClAro.tion but a.dde
thRt no

particul~r

reHgi.ous

____________

Rec·~

ou~ht t::i

nr soci"lty

~I' <?ot'lhl ish"?d by law in pr.eforenr,t:· t0 o+tiern, 7L::

.

1Q!..io ~

68

_...,.....,.___..._......._..

h9 favored

...

p,?21.

69thJ,9_. p.224; s~e also Carl Van Doren, .T.ti~ £1t~il Jlr,.b<3p.rsl'-l, New York,
1

rrh~ 'Tik:i.ng Presa, (1948). p.2J7.

'T0,,11·
"' 10 t ' p. 2"7
) •

7lTbid,.,

p.2~.

72 tbi_d~

.
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It was this identical .'ltne!ldment which Hhode I">Jand submittel to the Congress
::ilmost two yea-:-s later.

De~pi

te

tb~

parHcmentary m'l.nouvering.

adjourned hur:ust 2, 1788, withm,it accepti:lg or

reje~ting

th~ conv~mtion

the Constitution.

Committee report and the Consti tu ti on itself wert> finally accepted by

The

~forth

7
Carolina in November of 1789. 3

The records of tlle debetr.s of the ratifying conventions fill more than
t>-iree volumes of Elliot 1 s and eve--:y sjgnificant ;reference to relie-ion has been
mentioned herein - it is obviou2 that re:'.igfon was a relutiveJy minor issue,
There did not appear to be a g:'.·:,;at concern abm;t relie;ion as such in the ratifyinP," convent:i ons, perhaps because it w•tn a freed"lm which was not . then being
threetened.

There was far greater concern and far more discussion about the

trad.itional "rights of Englishr:ien 1 " tho.se rights such as trial by jury, habeas
corpus, etc., those legal safeguards which their colonial experience had taught
them could be withheld with disastrous results.

It ',"las thn protection of these

rights which led to the Bill of Eirrhts; a clause protectine religious freedom
was added almost as an after-thought, and in several
discussion.

ins~ances ~''ithout

a:r.y

Chapter IV

In the opinion of many

Congressmen~

newly convened Congress of the United

to the Constitution.

Mar.y

the first order of business of the

St;;,t(~s

wru'? the

preparation of ..A..mendlnents

of the ratifying comrentions had made it abundantly

clear that they were not satisfied that their rights were "\dequately protected
from the new central

government~

On June 8 9 1789 9 a motion was made in the

House of Representatives to consider amendments to the Constitutiono 1 A committee,

~onsisting

of a member from each state, was appointed to meet and con-

sider the various proposals which had been submitted by the Stateso 2 The
committee, led by Madison, made its report on July 28th and August 13th, 1789;
the House met as a

comm.itt~~

session are very brief.

of the

whole~

The recorded debates for that

The amendments concerning religion were consolidated

into one, which as originally submitted, was as follows:
no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal
rights of conscience be infringedo3

A Mr. Sylvester was concerned about the way it was expressed; he feared it
might tend to abolish religion altogether. 4 Mr. Gerry felt it would read
--------~-==-~·-

......

~.~-

1History of Congress, The Proceedil)gs o_f 1hQ. Se~ an_d Hou~ .Qf.
R~presentatives, 1789-93 (Philadelphiag Lea and Blanchard, 1843}~!, 152.
hereinafter referred to .qi:t fil.:'to_n:. of Congresso
2 ,.b.d

~·

3Dc:b9.tes .Q1:. Congress.'., fm l1fil. to 1856 (New York~ Do Appleton and
ComJ..u.ny, 1857), I, 136.
4T.
•d
.dll:_,
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better if it was thAt nno religious doctrine shall be established by law,"5
and Mro Sherman insisted, as he had at the Constitutional Convention, that the
whole thing was unnecessary because Congress had no power in that area. 6
Mr. Carroll was in favor of adopting the words because
the rights of conscience are in their nature of peculiar delicacy
and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand; and
as many sects have concurred. in opinion that i;ney are not secured
under the present constitution o•o it would tend more towards
conciliating the minds of the people to the government than almost
any other proposed amend.mento
He was not disposed to argue over the phraseolog-J

=

his object was

t~

secure

the substance in such a measure "as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part
of the community. 117

James Madison advised the House that he understood tha words to mean
that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce 'the
legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God
in any manner contrary to their conscienceo8
,'l ,\:lr.

Huntington said that he understood it the way Madison did, l.>ut that

others had construed it 11 in such a latitude as to be extremely nurtful. to the
cause of relig:i.on." Ministers and meeting houses we:re supported by contributions of those who belonged to their societies which were regulated by by-laws.
He was afraid that i f action were brought in Federal Court on any of these
cases, the person who had neglected to perform his engagement could not be compelled to do so, lor support of ministers or place of worship mi-ght be construed into a religious establisbment. 9 Another member of the House stated
that by the Charter in RhodP Island, no religion could be established and "the
people were enjoying the fruits of ito" He hoped the amendment could be
worded in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience but not to patronize

7Ibid.
8 Ibid.

9tbid.
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those who professed no religion at a11. 10 Madison suggested inserting the
word "national" before tnreligiono" Gerry objected strenuously to this because
this implied a national government rather than a federal government. 11 Another
gentleman suggested that it be worded:

"Congress shall make no laws .....12

The motion was passed 31 to 200
The rest of the amendments were debated and on August 18th the following
was adopted by the House of Representatives:
3o Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof; nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed •o~l3
In the Senate a motion was made to strike "religion •oo thereof" and to sub-

stitute "one religious sect or society in preference to others... This motion
failed.

A motion to reconsider then prevailed, and

altogether was made; this, toov was defeatedo

fl

motion to strike "3"

Finally the words "nor shall

the rights of conscience be infringed" were stricken 9 and the article agreed
t o.

14
Twelve amendments were submitted to the states for ratification on

September 25, 1789; of these, ten were ratified and the first two were rejected.15 The amendments went into effect December of 1791, when Virginia,
the eleventh state, gave its approval.

Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachu-

setts did not formally ratify the Bill of Rights until 1941 as part of the
one hundred and fiftieth anniversary celebration of the birth of the Bill of
Rights.
School children for generations have been nurtured on the story that a
few courageous men by their insistence on a Bill of Rights created and

lOibid.

l3History.Q! Congress, pol52.

11

14Ibido

Ibid.' p.1380

12Ibido

15Elliot I, 3750

41
preserved religious liberty for all time. 16 As a matter of fact, the main
battle for religious freedom had already taken place in the States, and it was
not the intent of the delegates at the ratifying conventions nor the men of
the First Congress to enlarge upon their religious rights, but rather to protect from the encroachment of the central government those rights they
already had.

The Constitution, by its silence, left the power to legislate

regarding religion to the states; most of the states had already indicated
through their own fundamental laws that freedom of conscience was an 11 inalienable right" dependent on a higher authority and not subject to governmental
interference.

The First Amendment of the Bill of Rights was an expression of

this belief o

16rn retrospect, this may be true; today it is the Federal Government
which is the protector of the inalienable rights of man, and it is fortunate
for us that there was an insistence on a Bill of Rights.

Chapter V

SUMMATION
The Puritans who settled Plymouth and Massachusetts migrated for the
sake of freedom of conscience, but it was their

.QID1

conscience they were con-

cerned with - the freedom to establish a monoply of their own religiono

It

was men like Roger Williams and William Penn who recognized the obUgation of
toleration as well as the right of choiceo

They recogrd:T.ed the right of

others to be different and started the American tradition of t•peaceful coexistencett among religious sectso

The prciprietary colonies seeking population

and trade rather than religious freedom also moved towards toleration.

The

variety of peoples and beliefs in Pennsylvania 1 New York, Maryland, and the
Caroli.nas worked for tolerance on practical groundso

The age of enlighten-

ment with its liberal thought and the Great Awakening with the resultant
multiplicity of sects also fostered the spirit of tolerationo

One writer

describing religious freedom in the Colonial period said, "Although the
cornerstones •• o had not yet been laid, the foundations were being excavated.111

By the time of the Revolution, tolerance was almost universal in the

Colonies.

What did American independence mean for religious liberty? Religious
liberty is not an isolated reality; it exists and is inseparable from
measures of liberty and independence, freedom from authority, and respect for

Th~

1Joseph L. Blau, Cornerstones .Q.f. Religious Freedom in America (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1950), po35.
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the worth and dignity of mano

'l'he doctrine of the nunalionable rights of man"

was the guiding star of the Hevolutiono

It was these

ri~hts

which were articu-

lated and codified by the people in the fifteen years from the

Decl~ratio4

of

Independence to the Bill of Rightso 2
A study of these references to religion suggests that a consensus had
been reached:

religion was a private matter

bet~cen

man an0 bis God and not

the concern of government; freedom of conscience was one of the inalienable
rights of man; that all men have an
the free exercise of their

equal~

religion~

natural and unalienable right to

i·1ithout compulsion or restraint; an.::. all

religious sects are entitled to equal treatment from the government.
the general attitude can best be summed up ns 11 1ive and let live.•:
philosophy of

lais~-faire

Perhaps
The

applied to religion.

There is no doubt that the people of the new nation were a religious
people.

Their documents abound with references to their debt and their grati-

tude to the Creatoro

By and large, their religious feeling was a personal one,

with definite opposition to outside compulsion of any sortc

No church should

be established, no man should be forced to support a church (even in those
states which attempted to establish churches, a man could support the church
of his choice), no clergyman could hold state office while practicing his
pastoral functions.

Time and time again, conventions were assured that be-

cause of the diversity and multiplicity of sects, no one denomination was
strong enough to establish itself as an official

church~

There was also general agreement that morality and piety are necessary
ingredients of good government, and considerable concern that "Jews, infidels,
-------~ --------~----...-_,

...._... _.._._.,..

~

2For an excellent swnmary of the actual practice in the states at the
time of the Constitution, see !Ii. Searle Bates, Religious Liberty: lill. Inquiry
(rfow York: International I!Iissionary Council, 1945), p.215<
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papists and mohametanstt might not be moral or pious enough to hold office.3
But they also realized that if they restricted the rights of one denomination,
their own rights could also be restricted; they recognized the liberty of
others in order to protect their own liberty.

Most of the states did restrict

the right to hold office because of religious belief, but this was the only
civil disability which existed in any of the states, contrary to the situation
which prevailed in most of the rest of the world.
perty, sue and be sued, appear as a
beliefso

w~tnesa,

A man could vote, hold pro-

etc, 1 regardless of his religious

In no other country was religious freedom so widespreade

The First Amendment left to the states the problem of freedom of conscience and the establishment of an official church.
fied by the First

~endment

But the principles codi-

had already been established in the states: they

were an expression of the status guoo

The new aspect of religious freedom

which was added by the Constitution - the removal of civil disabilities because of religious belief - was passed in the Constitutional Convention withou1 discussion, and adopted by the states almost as a matter of course.

This

was a departure from the practice of most of the states, but only South
Carolina thought it sufficiently offensive to require amending.

This final

step for full religious liberty was accomplished, on the Federal level, without difficultyo

3nespite constitutional provisions, North Carolina elected Catholic
Thomas Burke to the Continental Congress, and elected him Governor in
1781, ~Of p.216.

PART

II

Chapter I
THE

Are

ISSUE IS JOINED:

the views of the Revolutionary

gene~ation

pertinent in resolving

the complex freedom of religion issues which have been facing the Supreme
Court in recent years? The Constitution and Bill of Rights represent the
views of no single man but rather the compromises of many men.

While the

opinions of Jefferson and Madison on religion are enlightening, they are not
part of the Constitutiono An understanding of the history and background of
the Constitutional period can allow the Court to better discern the Framers'
intentions, but these intentions can and have been interpreted in diverse
ways.

The Constitution provides a broad frame of reference, not specific

answers, for where the Constitution does provide answers, questions do not
arise. Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "It is when the colors do not match, when
the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent, that
the serious business of the court begins. 111 When the Establishment clause
was first considered by the Supreme Court, the colors did clash.

There was

no index and no precedent to help the Court in its very serious businesso
The purpose of this section of the study is to examine the "serious
business" of the Supreme Court in its current interpretations of the religious
clause of the First Amendment.
To the man in the street, it appeared that the furor over religion in the

1Benjamin N. Cardozo, Nature -2!, ~ Judicial Process, Yale University
Press, New Haven, (1921), p.21.
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schools began with th& 1962 Regents 0 Prayer case; it did not.

As a matter of

fact, this case was the climax of a battle which has been waged in the state
courts for over one hundred years, and in the United States Supreme Court
since 1947.

The current controversy over religious observances in the public

schools is tied to the origins of the American public school, the history of
religious controversy, and the extent

and

significance of religious observ-

ances in the schools prior to the 1962 ruling.
The first •'public" schools in this country were the church-supported
•~town"

schools of puritan New England 11 which gradually evolved into the free

common school. 2 As the free common school grew 9 quarrels arose among the
various Protestant sects as to the type of religious and moral teaching to be
given in these schools.

Although it was generally agreed among the sects that

the 3chools would be secular institutions, they retained a distinctly Protea'tant - an.:i

puritan - flavor.

The coming of both Catholic and Jewish immi-

grants in the last half of the 19th Century, not only changed the religious
complexion of the country but also brought with it challenges to the Protestant features of public education. 3
Every state has in its Constitution a provision protecting religious
liberty.

In addition, twelve state constitutions specifically prohibit sec-

tarian instruction in the public schools 4 and all but Vermont have constitutional provisions prohibiting the expenditure of public funds, or at least

2

See for example, provisions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire
Constitutions, supra pol4. For a comprehensive review of the evolution of
the public school, see Donald Eo Boles, The Bible, Religion~ Public
Schools, (Ames, Iowa: The State University Press, 1963), pp.2-36; and Paul
Blanchard, Religionl!!!9..~ Public Schools? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963),
pp. 1-27.
Blanchard, ~·.ill• Po 7 •
4Joseph W. Harrison, "The Bible Education~ and the Public Schools,"
29 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, (1962) p.381; see also 45 ALR 2d 742 (1956)0
3

47
school funds, for sectarian purposes.5 The problem of what constitutes sectarian instruction, however, has been left to the courtso Eleven states re-_
quire by statute the reading of the Bible in the public classroom; statutes
in five states authorize, but do not require, reading from the Bible in the
classroom, and various legal bodies in twenty-three states have upheld practices and laws requiring or authorizing this practice.

On the other hand, in

eleven states, legal bodies have declared Bible reading a sectarian practice
and therefore forbidden by State and/or Federal Constitutionso
Those states which require or authorize Bible reading typically leave the
choice of the version of the Bible to be used to the participants, and in recent years, have included excusal provisions; these statutes usually specify
that the l'eading is to be "without comment 11 or explanation.

(In actual prac-

tice this raises a problem; if the passage is not explained, many children do
not understand it, and if it is explained, the explanation is likely to be the

'

..

teacher 8 s own personal sectarian interpretationo) Although the main focus in
recent years has been on Bible reading and prayer, there are many other sectarian (i.e. Christian) practices in the public schools.

Observance of relig-

ious holidays such as Christmas and Easter, Baccalaureate services, ministers
at school assemblies, teachers in religious garb, religious art in the schools,
religious tests in hiring teachers, and credit for church-sponsored Bible
classes are a few of the more prevalent ones.
Although practices in regard to religion in the schools vary from one
part of the country to anotherj those in the Texas public schools appear to

5Boles,

.Q.E.•

cit. p,43.

6Harrison, op .. cit~ po38l et~·; Boles,

.Q.E.•

cito pp.43-57 o
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present a typical picture. 7 A study revealed that 7gfo of the schools responding to a questionnaire had some form of Bible reading;
exercises;
days.

99%

had Christmas programs While only

89%

conducted prayer

11% observed the Jewish holi-

In fifteen school districts 9 ministers, priests 9 and nuns wearing cleri-

cal garb served as teachers in the public school8.

Religious surveys of pupils

were taken, and despite a Texas law stating that no school

~eaching

personnel

is to be asked ndirectly or indirectly'" about his religious affiliation,

9zt

of all respondents indicated that an effort is made to determine whether or
not the applicant has a religious affiliation..

'l:he

author concludes that "at

the present, the religious practices in the public schools of Texas seem less
an aid for the education of all children than they are a support for (Protestant) sectarian purposeso"
The Tennessee Supreme Court 9 in 1956, upheld a state statute requiring
the daily reading of the Bible in the public schools.

a· The decision revealed

that the King James version of the Bible was read in the classroom, that the
Lor<P s Prayer was recited, and that hymnR were frequently sung; it also revealed that teachers commonly asked students questions pertaining to the
daily Bible reading.

A

survey in 19609 showed a very high level of compliance

with the Knoxville, Tennessee Board of Education ruling requiring "Bible reading without comment.'' However, over two-thirds of the teachers "defined"
certain words (definition of certain key words would certainly be considered
interpretation and come within the realm of ttcomment") and some teachers indicated that they refused to excuse a student from

r~ls

turn at reading the

7Earl L. Humble, !,e.lJ..P.jous R.r~tic_ll 1!1 Texas Public Sghools% unpublished
thesis, Southwestern Theological Seminary 1 Fort Worth, Texas, summarized;
Pamphlet, Anti-Defamation League of Bunai B0 rith, New York~

8carden v. Bland, 199 Tenno 665, 288 S.WQ2d 718 (1956)0
9Harrison, .Ql?.o.ill•• p~395, ,.ilo~c
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Biblee

'I'he majority of teachers furnished the Bible to be used, althoi:.gh in

some instances it was furnished by the school, by interested religious groups,
or by Gideon Internationalo
15

The time spent varied from less than 5 minutes to

It is not without significance that although few of the teachers

minutes~

would abolish the program, "the overwhelming majority ••o were rather conservative in their praise for the program."lO In addition to Bible reading (which
is the only religious activity authorized by statute) pupils participated in
recitation of prayers, religious

plays~

Bibical map

drawing~

drills, Chapel programs and other related activities~ 11

Bible memory

In the majority of

the schools, elementary pupils participated in various religious practices for
the holidays, permission was granted for the distribution of religious literature by church groups, ministers were frequently invited to give talks which
were either inspirational or descriptive of their religion; some schools had
compulsory chapel attendance, and some had an elective course in Bible for
which as much as one unit of credit was giveno
~

There are interesting regional differences in the extent of religious

practices in the schools throughout the countryo

12

To the question ttare home-

room devotional services held in the schools of your system?", of all school
systems, 68.% of those in the East and 60}& of those in the South had such devotionals in contrast with the Midwest with 6% and the West with only 2/oc
Bible reading was conducted in 67/o of the Eastern schools, 76% of the Southern
..

lOibido, p.400

11._.A_.,
Ib·d
12Ricbard B. Dierenfieldj Religion i.B, American Public Schools, (Public
Affairs Press, 1962). This work was introduced into the record of the House
Judiciary Committee, Hearings Before the Committee .Q.U ~ Judiciary House 2f..
Representatives, 88th Congress, {u.s. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1964) on the proposed amendments to the Constitution relating to prayers
and Bible reading in the Public Schools (herinafter referred to as Hearings)
and is quoted therefrom~ pp.2414-2440.
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schools, but in only 18}0 of llidwestern and 11% of Western schools. 13 Of those
questioned concerning "released time" only

lo%

of the Southern schools had such

a program, while 44% of Eastern, 2gf., of Western 9 and 27/o of Midwestern schools
participated$ 14 Interestingly enough 9 when school administrators were asked
their opinions of the released time

program~

there was much more uniformity of

opinion - only a few percentage points separated the administrators in various
parts of the country.

21}b in the United States aa a whole felt that this pro-

gram was of no value, while only l~ felt it wan of great value. 15.

The action of state courts in this area presents no similar geographic
pattern, but rather reflects the diversity of American religious practice$.
The highest courts of eleven states have held that various state and local
statutes requiring Bible reading in the schools do not violate state constitutions (Colorado 11 Georgia., Iowa, Kansas? Maine, Michigan, Uebraska, New Jersey,
Ohio, Texas, Tennessee) and four have held Bible reading unconstitutional under
16
state constitutions (Illinois, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin).
The
first of these state cases was decided in 1854, 17 almost a hundred years before
religious freedoms of the First Amendment were considered by the United States
Supreme Court; obviously, the is5'Ue is not a new one!
In 1925- the Supreme Court held that the right of a parent to send his
child to a private or parochial school was a property right under the Due

l3Hearings, ~024180
14Ibido p.24270

-·

15 Ibid$ p.2435.
16For a summary of these decisionst see Harrison~ .2.R•illo ppo38l-385;
see also, Abington School District -:f..o Schempp, po374 UoS. 203 (1963); concurring opinion of !fro Justice Brennan9 p.2c-o
17nonahoe i· Richards, 38 Meo 3761 (1854)0
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Process clause of the Fourteenth Am.end.ment18 and in 19:50, the Court permitted
Louisiana to use state funds for text books for parochial elementary schools
without even mentioning the First 1.mendmento

This case introduced the "child

benefit theoryo 1119 Nro Justice Cardo~o extended the application of the First
Amendme11t to the states in the Cantwell case in 1940}0 This decision~ and
subsequent "Jehovah 0 s Witnesses cases" based on the F'ree Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment~

21

served to define the broad outlines of the meaning of

freedom of religion, thus paving the way for more conventional sects to claim
protection from any kind of religious discrimination or establishment even
when it was completely sanctioned by local law and local custom.
Abortive attempts

wor~

rnade

to bring the ''religion in the schools" issue

before the $'upreme Court, but it was not until 1962 that the opponents of
Bible reading in the schools succeeded.

In the

meantime~

the first major

case involving the schools and religion decided under the Establishment
22

clause of the First Amendment was the Everson

case in 19470 The Court held

that a local ordinance authorized by New Jersey statute, providing for 'bus
transportation for parochial school pupils was not an Establishment and therefore constitutional. The following year, an Illinois on-premises releasedtime23 program was held to be an unconstitutional Establishment, while in 1952,
the New York state program of off-premises released-time24 was held

18Pierce .Y> Society .Qf, Sisters, 281 UoSo 370, (1930) .,
19cochran Y.• I.ouisiana~ 281 v. U.S. 510 (1930).
9
20cantwell Y.• Connecticut, 310 U.So 296, (1940).

21Minersville v. Gobiti.s, 310 U.S. 586, (1940); ~Virginia Y.o Barnette,
319 u.s. 624, (1943T~
22mverson Y.• ~ ..Qf, Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.s. 1 (1947).
11
23ricCollum v. Board of Education, 333 UoS• 203, (1948).

-------- ---

24zorach

y. QJausen,

343 U.s. 3061) (1952) •.
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constitutional.
Ten years later the controversial issue of prayers in the schools was
finally considered by the Court,
State Board of

Regents~

In the F.ngel 25 case, in finding the New York

prayer an unconstitutional establishmP-nt, the Court

stated irthat it is not the business of government to compose and prescribe
official prayersotr

In the heat of the controver.Jy which followed the Court's

holding in th.is case, the decision which really went to tho hP.a,..t of the
matter was almost unnoticed.

The §.c:..l?.emp,E26 and Mu;:raz27 mises, from Pennsyl-

vania. and Harylandj concerned the traditional 1''morning devotional, 11 and held
that reading the Bible and reciting the Lordijs Frayer in the public tax-

surported schools is clearly an unconstitutional establishment of religion.

~?~.!.o Vitale~ 370 U.So 421, \1962)0
26
Abi.ngton ,Yo Ilgll..fil!illll, £mo£ilo
27Murrt!Y.!.• Curlettr 374 U.S. 203, (1963), hereinafter referred to,
together with above cane, as SchemPPo

Chapter II

VOX POPULI
The _public reaction which followed the Engel case was swift, emotional,
vehement, and perhaps inevitable in view of the political temper of the times.
No Supreme Court decision since the school desegregation cases aroused so much
emotion - condemnation of the Court and its decision appeared to be almost
unanimous.. Herbert Hoover called the decision a "disintegration of one of the
most sacred American heritages, "1 a South Carolina Congressman2 said,

••r know of

nothing in my lifetime that could give more aid and comfprt to Moscow than this
bold, TilB.licious, atheistic, and sacrilegious twist of this unpredictable group
of uncontrolled despots."

Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina declared

thRt "••o the Supreme Court has held that God is unconstitutional and for that

reR"IOn, the public schools must be segregated against Him? 03 Representative
George Andrews of Alabama said, "They put the negroes in the schools and now
they have driven God out 11 ; 4 and former President Eisenhower, "I have always
thought this Nation was essentially a religious one. 115

l.rrME Magazine, July 6, 1962, p.8 ..
21. Mendel Rivers quoted in
1

1ifil!. York Times, July ~' 1962, p.lOE.

3Ibid.
4new ~_Times, July l, 1962. seco 4, p.lo
5Ibid. For a summary of opinions - see Paul G~ Kauper, "Prayer, Public
Schools and the Supreme Court," 61 Mico LoR. 1031, (1963) and Blanchard, .QJ2.•.£ii•
p.52 et.seq.
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t:ardinal Spellman commenced a blistering attack on the Court with "This decigion atrikes at the very heart of the Godly tradition in which

America~s

children have for so long been raisedc~ 6 Commented the New York Post in an
editorial entitled "Prayer and Politics," "The indignation of the Catholic
hierarchy is understandableo

It is prompted, we suspect, not over the prohibi-

tion of a prayer which many churchmen would agree has little religious value,
but by the potential impact of the decision on the aid-to-education battle. 11 7
Billy Graham deplored the Court's secularism - "The framers of our Constitution
meant we were to have freedom of religion and not freedom from religion." 8
Bishop James A.

~e

of the California Protestant Episcopal Diocese, issued a

legal attack on the decision and immediately commenced a movement for a constitutional amendment. 9 The reaction of other Protestant churchmen was mixed and
somewhat more moderate.

The initial Methodist reaction was that the decision

was an "obvious blow to religions freedom," and "in eH'ect makes secularism the
national religion." A few days later, the National Council o!' Churches, through
its Director of Religious
decision.

Liberty~

asserted "Many Christians will welcome this

It protects the religious rights of minorities and guards against

the development of 'public school religion' which is neither Christianity or
Judaism, but something less than either~ulO The American Baptists tended to be
favorable to the decision, while the Unitarians expressed unequivocal approval.
The

~'upreme

Court received strong support from the 1963 General Assembly of the

United Presbyterian Church which opposed Bible reading and prayer in the public

6New York~' June 26, 19629 pQL
7summarized in

!ru! ~Times, June 29, 19620

8New York Times, July l, 1962, seco4, p~lo

---

9Blanchard, .QJ?.•.Qllo pp.171-1730
lOibid., po65.
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classrooms9 which declared, "We Presbyterians wish to live, teach, A.Ild evangelize in a political order in which no church will dominate the civil authorities
or be dominated by them." 11
The Jewish Community has been almost unanimous in its support of the
Court's position.

The American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee,

and the .Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
which f'iled amicus briefs in

the~

B~rith

ware among the organizations

case. The Synagogue Council of America,

through its president, Ilro Julius Marksg stated, "It has been our belief that
prayer of any sort should be fostered in the home, church, and synagogue and
that public institutions such as the public school should be free of such sectarian practices.

We have further held to the belief that prayer of 'common

core' can only lead to a watering down of all that is spiritually meaningful in
every religious faithon 12
The Congressional critics of the Court were given a boost by the Conference of American Governors 9 meeting at Hershey, Pennsylvania :ln July of 1962
which passed an almost unanimous resolution that the right to have nondenominational prayers in the public schools be restored by Constitutional
amendment - Governor Rockefeller was the only governor who did not vote, on
the ground that he needed more time to study the mattero

For days following

the decisions, the Letters to the Editor columns were filled with denunciations
of the Court.

The impression gained from reading the periodicals was of vir-

tually unanimous opposition to the Court and its holding.

Gradually, however,

sentiment began to turn, as one religious leader after another came out in
favor of the

~ecision.

12neprinted by .Anti-Defamation League of B~nai B'rith, New York, January,
1963, pamphlet "Religious Spokesmen in Support of the UoS~ Supreme Court Decision on Prayer in the .PubUo Schools.,"

The reaction to the SchempJl and ]:!urray docision of 1963 was almost peaceful compared to the storm after
cision was

pr~ctically

1~1

- although the sentiment against the de-

the same, the decision itself received almost no comment

in the public press - these decisions entered the public scene like the proverbial lambs For one thing, the decision went almost unnoticed because it was
handed down in June, 1963 when the nation was in the midst of a civil rights
crisis - the news media were full of the impending march on Washington by Negro
civil rights workers; for another, the interdenominational character of the decision was emphasized by the fact that the opinion of the Court was assigned
to Justice Tom Clark, a prominent Presbyterian layman, while concurring opinions were written by Goldberg, the only Jew on the Court, and Brennan, the only
Catholico

In addition, the relatively narrow decision in pngel not only acted

as a buffer, but made the far more reaching Schempp decision a foregone conclusion.
A United Press International survey regarding the opening day of school,

1

September, 1963, showed that despite the ban against religious devotions, thousands of children began their first day of school with Bible reading and/or
prayer13 and Associated Press concluded that most schools continued their former practices. The New York Times, immediately after the Schempp decision,
quoted the State Superintendent of Education from Columbia, South Carolina to
the effect that the state intended to ignore the ruling since South Carolina
had no law on the subject. 14 Alabama was openly defiant, Governor George
Wallace said, "We donut care what the Supreme Court said"; and two California
legislatures introduced a bill to prohibit instruction in the Darwinian theory
sinc13

1

11

i f it is illegal to present religion in the schools, it must be equally

3noak,

.Q:Q•fil• p.23o

11J-une 18 1963~ po29G
9
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illegal to present anti-religious doctrineso 1115 Arkansas and Delaware still
required prayer, other states called for moments of

meditation~

inspirational

reading, or a course of study dealing with the Bibleo 16 The same survey showed
that most of the schools in the West (where the practice was not widespread)
were abiding by the decision, but in New Jersey, the community of Hawthorne17
challenged the 1963 Supreme Court's ruling, and according to a school principal
in one metropolitan area connnunity, "the decision is not enforced throughout the
state."18
Th~

most drastic reaction of all came from Congresso

Over 148 Resolutions

proposing .Amendments to the Constitution were submitted by 115 Congressmen. 19
The resolutions which were referred to Emanuel Celler•s House Committee on the
Judicia:cy had as their main objective to overrule the Supreme Court - to put
"God back into the schoolso" Typical of these resolutions was H. J. Res. 693,
20
88th Congress First Session introduced by Frank Jo Becker, Republican from
New York:
Sec. lo Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit
the offering, reading from, or listening to prayers or
Biblical scriptures, i f participation therein is on a
voluntary basis, in any governmental or public school,
institution, or placeo

l5Doak,

.QR.. Cit.

p.24 ..

16Ibid .. , p.23. See Frank J. Sorauf, "Zorach v. Clausen: The Impact of a
Supreme Court Decision" 53 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 777 (1959) for a reviev of
effects and compliance with that decisiono
17New York Times, January 16, 1965, p .. lo The American Legion of Hawthorne
planned to distribute, through the P.T.A., book covers bearing a nondenominational prayer. The President of the Board of Education said there was
no legal reason why pupils could not read prayer to themselves every morning.
18This information was obtained through a personal interview on
Novemb~~

16, 1964.

19Hearings. pp.iii-vi.
....
20Ibido, p.22.

For text of other resolutions, see pp.1-59 of Heariwm_.
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Sec o 2 o

Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit
making reference to belief in, reliance upon 9 or invoking
the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any governmental or

public document, proceeding, activity, ceremony, school,
institution, or place, or upon any coinage, currency~ or
obligation of the United States.
Sec.

)o

Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of religion.

The testimony at the Hearings of these resolutions, held in April and May

of 1964, fills 2774 pages in three volumeso

At least 73 Congressmen testified,

almost all in favor of some kind of constitutional amendmento

So overwhelming

did congressional sentiment appear to be, that when Representative B. F.

Sisk~

(Democrat, California) spoke out against any amendment~ Chainna.n Cellar commented that "you are very much like a breath of cool air in the heat of summer. •f 21 'I'he list of witnesses reads like the roster of ,who 1 s who in American
religion" - church leaders from every major faith testified before the Committeethe great majority of them opposed to any amendment!

The proposal.to change the

First Amendment, as reflected in the mail to the committee, was more agreeable
to the populace at large than it was to leadership groups, in fact, one witness
referred to the church leaders as "generals without a.rmieso"

22

Constitutional

lawyers from the nationns leading law schools have rarely been in such complete
agreement.

In addition to the testimony of such prominent Supreme Court critics

as Paul Freund, Harvard; Philip Kurland, University of Chicago; Dean Jefferson

B. Fordham, University of Pennsylvania; Dean Willard Heckel, Rutgers University;
Wilber G. Katz, University of Wisconsin; and Paul G. Kauper, University of
Michigan; letters and prepared statements were submitted by a great many more
experts in the Constitutional law field, including a statement signed by 223
constitutional lawyers.

21

Represented in this group were faculty members and

Ibido, P~5.3,3o

22George LaNove. Hearings, pg2442.

59
deans of law schools all over the country. 23 The scholars were unanimous in
their opposition to an amendment to the Constitutiono

In additionj such organi-

zations as the Anti-Defamation League, the American Civil Liberties Union, and
the National Council of Churches were strongly opposed to any change in the
First Amendment~ 24
In view of the impressive array of opponents to the Becker

one

Amendment~

might well ask who was in favor of the amendmento

A great many private citizens

wrote to the committee asking that prayers be

back in the schools.,"

t~put

Indi-

vidual congregations 9 and individual ministers from all over the country,
Veterans' organizations, Billy Graham 7 Cardinal Spellman, and Governor George
Wallace of Alabama all defended the "right o~ little children to pray. 1• 25 Fortunately for the integrity of the First Amendment, the proposal was never··reported out of Committee. 26 This was due in a large measure to the skillful and
diplomatic handling of the Hearings by Chairman Cellar, and to the fact that
those who were in favor of an amendment were unable to agree on wording which
would nullify the Supreme Court 9 s decision without opening Pandora's box to a
host of other problems.

Who would prescribe the prayers? How much time could

be devoted to prayer? Is it possible to write a non=denominational prayer?

lrJhat recourse have those who are offended by the prayer? 'What effect would such
an amendment have on already existing state prohibitions?

24-.

•
'Hean.ngs,

~eseg,o and p.,577 tloseg. The pros and cons of the issue
are fairly well brought out in the testimony and questioning of Congressman
Becker, the most active proponent of the measureo
25Hearinga, pe211

26The House did manage to show its resentment of the Supreme Court by rejecting the Senate's proposed salary increase for the Justices, see Uilliam May,
"Court Foes Have Field Day," Newark Sunday news, March 22, 1965, sec. 2, p.C).
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The popular opposition to the
categories; l.

Court~s

decision can be summed up in three

those who look for any opportunity to discrcdi.t the Court be-

cause of the Courtus recent activist role

~

ioeo Southerners who are still

smarting under the Segregation decisions, 2. those who

'~make

political hay" out

of being in favor of God and against the Court, and 3. those sincere people who
are genuinely concerned with the umoral decay" of our society and feel that the
Supreme Court bas taken one more step in that direction,
return to the idyllic days of the status
history of controversy in this

ante~quo

-

which~

Most would like to
in view of-the long

is somewhat like trying to sweep the whole
issue under the rug and out of sight .. 27
area~

27As this is being written, Senator Everett Dirksen's attempt to push a
similar amendment through the Senate failedo The Senate rejected the "Dirksen
Amendment" by a vote of 49 to 37, nine votes short of the necessary two-thirds
majorityo ~York Times~ September 21~ 1966, p.l ..

Chapter III
OF SCHOOL BUSES AJID RELEASE'D TI!rb'.

Just what were these cases which aroused such universal public opposition'?
Although the Engel, 9 Schempp and Murray cases were the immediate reason for the
public outcry, they must be considered with several other equally controversial
cases which laid the groundwork and established the legal theories on which
these oases are based.

The first of these precedent-making cases was the Hew
Jersey School bus case in 1947. 1 Under a New Jersey statute which authorized
local school boards to make contracts for the transportation of children to and
from schools other than private schools operated for profit 9 the township authorized reimbursement of bus fares to parents of children in the public schools and
in the Catholic parochial schoolso
by

This payment of public funds was challenged

a district taxpayer as being a violation of the First Amendment of the

:B'ederal Constitution., The ?few Jersey court of original jurisdiction held that
the statute in question was a violation of the New Jersey Constitution, 2 while
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed the Trial Court saying
that it violated neither the Federal nor the State Constitutiono 3 As a case of
first impression, a great deal of interest was aroused - the American Civil
Liberties Union appeared as amicus curiae for Everson, while the Attorneys

~

1Everson ,Y:o Board .2.t Education .Ql. ~ Tovnshi.E. 91.. E.)!;i.p,g~ 330 UGSo 1, (1947).
2
39;.• 2d 75 (1944)
0

344Ao 2d 333 (1945)e
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General of several states and the National Council of Catholic Men appeared for
the school boardo Mr. Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion, was
joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed, Douglas and Murphy.

Mr. Justice Black began his analysis of the problem with a comprehensive
discussion of the background of the First Amendment, with special attention to
Madison's Remonstrance and Jefferson°s "wall of separation," and with particular emphasis on the feeling of the Founding Fathers that no individual should
be taxed to support a religious institution of any kindo

He then gave his now-

famous definition of the Establishment clause.
The Establishment clause means at least this: 4
1.

Heither state nor federal government can set up a church.

2.

Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.5

3. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess
belief or disbelief in any religion.

4. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs or for church attendance
or non-attendanceo
5. No tax in any amount can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions - whatever form they may adopt,
teach or practice.
6o

?leither state nor federal government can openly or secretly
participate in affairs of any religious organization or
groups or vice versa.

"In the words of Jefferson, the r.lause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect a ewall of separation' between church and state. •t 6 One is

4Everson, .2:2•.ill•, pp~l5-16"

5The local ordinance applied only to Catholic parochial schools, a fact
which was evidently not considered significant by the majority, however, this
point is raised by Justice Jackson in his dissent at po20 and Rutledge, p.62.
6Everson, ,QRcill,o, ppol5~16.,
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mildly astonished to read Justice Black"s conclusion

~

in view of this broad

language - that ttthe wall must be kept high and impregnableo
approve the slightest breacho

WP would not

New Jersey has not breached it hereo"

7

In upholding the school board, the majority compared providing transportation to providing services of police and fire which is, of course, extended to
all; nthe state contributes no money to the church schools, it does not support
them, tiU 11 We must be careful in protecting the citizens of lrew Jersey against
state established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit

new Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all citizens without regard to their religious beliefs." 9 Thus the child-benefit theory appeared
in full bloomo

The benefit of the legislation is for the child; any benefit

which the church may receive is

Four Justices dissentedo

o~ly

incidental.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter,

went into considerable detail to show that the parochial school is a vital part
of the Catholic church's program; attendance is made compulsory, and the curriculum is prescribed by the dioceseo

He was very critical of the majority,

and easily distinguished fire and police protection from the furnishing of bus
transportation - in the later case he pointed out, the test by which the beneficiaries of the expenditure were chosen is essentially a religious one; ignoring this religious test is the basic fallacy of the majorityolO Freedom of religion is set forth in absolute termso
case over bus fareso

~This

is not, therefore, just a little

In paraphrase of Madison, distant as it may be in its

present form from a complete establishment of religion, it differs from it

7Ibid°' pol8. Since so much of what is said above is completely unnecessary to the result actually reached by the Court, one cannot help but feel that
what started out to be a reversal~ became in the course of deliberations, an
affi:rmance - did one of the Justices switch sides?
8

Ibido

lOibid., p.25o
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only in degree; and it is the first step in that directioJl_nll
The seconci. dissent, by Justice

Rutledge~

in which he was joined by

Justice Burton as well as Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, is believed by
many writers to be the classic statement of the problem, and the view that will
ultimately prevail$

He, too, relied on history 9 and incorporated Madison's

views into his interpretation of the First Amendmento

He is concerned, how-

ever, not so much with thP intentions )f the Founding Fathers regarding specifie areas involving religion, hut rather with the overall purpose of the First
Amendmento

12

The purpose 11f the :Pirst Amendment was Hto create a complete and

permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority
by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion."
Transportation is an integral part of schooling which cannot be separated from
the paying of tuition or teachers 8 salaries or books, the benefit to the church
is real and not incidenta1. 13 According to Justice Rutledge, two great drives
are constantly in motion to abridge, in the name of Aducation, the complete
division of religious and civil authority; one to introduce religious education and observances into the public schools and the other to obtain public
funds for aid and support of various private religious schools - 1tin my opinion,

both avenues were closed by-the Constitutiono Neither should be opened

by this

Court, 1114
The following year, the court was almost unanimous in its decision in the
McCollum caseo 15 The plaintiff 9 a resident, taxpayer 9 and parent of a child
attending the school in question, objected to the Illinois
program.

11
12

'~released

time"

The program, sponsored by the various religious denominations of the

Ibido t Po57 e

l)Ibido~ po48•

Ibid.~ ppo3l-44o

14Ibido9 pe63o
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communityv consisted of weekly religious teachings in the school during school
hours.

Participation was voluntary, and those who did not participate in reli-

gious instruction had their regular secular studiese

16

In an eight to one deci-

sion, this practice was held to be an unconstitutional Establishment.
Black again wrote the opinion of the Courte

Justice

After reviewing the facts, he

found that nthis is beyond question, the utilization of tax-established and taxsupported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith, 1117
the state provides pupils for religious classes through the use of the

state~s

compulsory school machinery - this constitutes an establishment "as we interpreted it in Everson. 1118
Justice

Frankfurter~

concurring in the decision and speaking for the dis-

senters in Everson, 19 reviewed the history of public education and religious
instruction. .Although the separation principle was established early in the
1860 1 s, community leaders concerned with giving children some religious instruction tried to bring this instruction in during the

child~s

"working day."

By

1914, this practice had evolved into "released timeo 1120 In Illinois, the fact
that the power of the school board had not been used to discriminate between
religions was not material; the fact that the child was offered an alternative
reduced

constraint~

but did not eliminate the influence of the school in mat-

ters sacred to conscience and outside the school 0 s domain.

21

Frankfurter

16Ibid., ppo205-206o

17Ibid., Pe210 ..
18Ibid.,

19Justices Rutledge and Burton also concurred in the Court 0 s opinion.
Ibid., p.213.
20Ib"d
__1._o ~ pp.213-2240
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stated that if the child were "villing"~ other time could be found - dismissed
22
time could be utilized?
but in the present set of facts, the momentum of the
whole school atmosphere and school planning was put behind religious instruction$ 23 The plaintiff asked the Court to ~prohibit all instruction in and
teaching of religious education in public

schools~

- this the Court said it

could not do, because there are many areas of secular study which involve the
discussion of religion - the study of the Reformation, for example. 24
Mro Justice Jackson, in a separate concurring

opinion~

ious clauses here go beyond the permissible,

however, the plaintiff asks for

1

~

stated that the "relig-

more than she is entitled to, and the Court has not set standards that the
states can follow in the futureo 25
Justice Reed 9 the only dissenter 9 a.greed with the g0neral principles set
forth by the majority, but not with their conclusions. 26 He too, cited his9

tory to bolster his case - Jefferson's establishment of centers of religions
at the University of Virginia. 27 Reed distinguished an Illinois case 28 which
struck down Bible reading and prayer as being worship services and activities
which were "ceremonial and compulsory" - he found the practices at issue

22

Released time - children who participate are released to attend religious instructions~ others are kept in their secular classes; Dismissed time all children are freed from classes, those who so desire may attend religious
instructions, the others are free to do as they wish.
2

3McCollum, .QJ?Q,illo, po230.

24Ibid., pp.234-2350

25 Ibid., p.237.
26 Ibid., p.239&
27 Ibid., p.2450 He neglected to mention that Jefferson also opposed
religious education in the public schools - quoted in Blanchard, M•ill• p.13.
2

~y& Board of Education, 71NE2d161 (1947).,
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nvoluntary and educationaL" 29 He further warned, "This Court cannot be too
cautious in upsetting practices imbedded in our society by many years of experience •••• The history of the past practices is determinative of the meaning of a Constitutional clause."30
The attack on the Court following the McCollum decision was only slightly
less vehement than that which followed the more recent Engel case, according
to one writer, this led to distinguishing the Zorach case on "gossamer thin
grounds. 1131 The facts in the Zorach case 32 were similar to those of McCollum
with one difference which the court found signifi.canto

Several New York City

taxpayers and parents objected to that City 6 s "released time" program.

Public

school pupils with parental permission were excused from school for one hour
a week, during school hours, to attend religious centers for religious instruction, attendance was kept and reports were sent to the school by the religious
institution.

Those who did not participate remained in the classroom, and were

given, according to the testimony, "busy work.n 33 Justice Douglas, speaking
for the Court, in upholding the program, found that it "involves neither religious instruction in the classroom, nor expenditure of public funds" - all costs
are paid by the religious institutions. 34 Although plaintiffs claim that the
weight and influence of the school are put behind the program - the teachers
police the program, classroom activities halt, and the school is used as a
crutch for the church, 35 - Douglas disagreedQ
the public schools merely accomodated religiono

He found no evidence of coercion;
It was in this context that

29McCollum, .Q.£oCito, po253.
30Ibid., po256o
3lKurland, ttFull of Sound and Fury Signifying .o." .Q.£oCit., po4•
32zorach .!.• Clausen, 343 UcS. 306, (1952).
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his now-famous dicta was uttered,

0

We are a religious people whose institutions

presuppose a Supreme Being 11 36
0

l<lro Justice

Black~

dissenting, finds no difference between McCollum and the

instant case - the sole question is whether New York can use its compulsory education laws to help religious sects to get attendants presumably too unenthusiastic to go unless moved by the pressure of state machineryo 37 Free choice is
removed by operation of the state; the state makes religious sects the beneficiaries of its power to compel children to attend secular schools.38 "In
considering whether the state has entered this forbidden field the question is
not whether it has entered too far~ but whether it has entered at allo 1~39

"The

government should not under cover of the soft euphemism of 0 cooperation-1' steal
into the sacred area of religious choice o,AO The First Amendment has lost much
if the religious follower and athiest alike are no longer judicially regarded
as entitled to equal justice under lawo He implied that the Court was bowing
to public pressure, "I am aware that our McCollum decision on separation of
church and state has been subject to a most searching examination, ••• Probably fewer opinions in recent years have attracted more attention or stirred
more debate." 41 He added, in reply to Douglasp that because we were- a religious people that the First Amendment was adopted. 42
Jackson, in his dissent, called the distinction between McCollum
Zorach "trivial almost to the point of

cynicism~

.~d

magnifying non-essential de-

tails and disparaging the compulsion which is the underlying reason for the
statuteus invalidityott 43 The truant officerw in effect, compelled attendance
while the school served as a temporary jail for the pupils who did not wish

36Ibid .. , p.313.

39Ibido

42Ibid.;,

p.319.

37Ibid., p .. 318g

4oibid .. , p.320.

43 Ibid,,,

Po325o

38Ibid ..

41

Ibid~, Po317

g•
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to go to church, 44 and Jackson admonished his "evangelistic brethren" not to
confuse objection to compulsion with objection to religiono 45

Frankfurter, in

still a third dissent, distinguished released and dismissed timeo

In the

instant case, formalized religious instruction was substituted for other school
activity, and there was coercion by the very nature of the system.

46

He added

that principles were disregarded, but fortunately not disavowed in this case. 47
In the same termt the Court handed down the DorelllUs decision48 in whicl1
the Court ducked the issue which was later presented in the Schempp and Murray
cases..

An

action for declaratory judgment was brought by local taxpayers and

the parent of a child who had graduated from the public schools in the course
of the litigation, to interpret a New Jersey statute which read in part that
the public schools shall hold 11 no religious service

•oo

ezcept" the reading of

five verses from the Old Testament (without comment) and the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer.

New Jerseyes highest court upheld the constitutionality of the

statute and an appeal was filedo

The American Civil Liberties Union and The

American Jewish Congress filed amicus briefs on behalf of Doremus, while the
Attorneys - General of Pennsylvania and Now York appeared for the Board of
Educationo

In a six-to-three decision, the appeal was dismissed.

Jackson, speaking for the majority, and citing Mellon

Vo

Justice

Frothingham49 stated

that a taxpayer's suit must be a "pocket book" suit and since there was no showing that Bible reading adds to taxes, the rule of di minimus applied.

It was

conceded that the child had graduated, therefore, no issue of damage to the
child was raisedo

It is settled law that the Supreme Court will only consider

44Ibid., p.324e

45Ibido

46

. 47

Ibido, p.-32lo
Ibid., p .. 3220

4-Snoremus y. ~ .Qf. Education~ 342 U.So 429, (1952)
49Mellon .!,o Frothingham., 262 U.s. 447, (1923) o

&
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~ "case or controversy?" which does not exist hereo 50 Douglas,

in a strong dis-

sent, joined by Reed and Burton, felt that the case deserved a hearing on the
merits, "where the clash of interests is as strong as it is here, it is odd indeed to hold there is no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.
(2) of the Constitution •~o the issue is not feigned, the suit is not collusive,
the mismanagement of the school system that is alleged is clear and plain."51
The Court was obviously avoiding the issue, which was not finally decided until
the Engel and Schempp cases a decade later - quite possibly for fear that the
decision would be "wrong."

Chapter IV
PRAYERS AND BIBLE READING
In 1951, the New York State Board of Regents, after considerable discussion about the extent and character of ''moral training" in the New York schools, 1
issued a document called "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the
Schools" for the guidance of all state education officials. 2 Included in this
document was the now infamous "non-denominational"

preye~

composed - after la-

borious discussion - by religious leaders of most of the denominations represented in New York, and obviously intended to offend noneo
by

It was accompanied

a further statement from the Regents that "belief in and dependence upon

Almighty God was the very cornerstone upon which our founding fathers builded."
Theoretically, the use of this prayer was made voluntary at all levels but often
the machinery for excusing children was vague or entirely missing. 3 The Board
of Education of New Hyde Park, acting in its official capacity under this policy
statement, directed the School district's principals to have said aloud by each
class, in the presence of the teacher at the beginning of every school day, the
following prayer:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our country."4

1Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), p.422.
2For te~t of statement, seP ~earings, pp.634-5; for an account of the relig-

ious and political struggle that preceded this document, see Boles, .QI?.•ill·,
p.177, and Blanchard, .QI?.•fil•, pp.33-353xJ1anchard, Po35·

4sngel, .QI?.•ill•, p.422.
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Soon after this

~rayer

was adopted by the School Board, ten parent-taxpayers

brought action in the New York Courts claiming that the use of the prayer was
contrary to their beliefs, religions, or religious practices, and that the
action of the Regents and the School Board constituted an Establishment of religion in viola~ion of the Federal Constitution. 5 Thus began the En~l case's
long legal journey .to the United States Supreme Court. The New York Supreme
Court (the trial Court) 6 rejected the petitioner's claims, but made it clear
that procedures and safeguards which would guarantee the plaintiffs' right of
Free Exercise must be adoptedo

This view was affirmed by the New York Court

of Appeals in a three-two decision. 7
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Black, speaking for
an almost unanimous Court, 8 summarily rejected the coutGntion of the state
courts.

"We think that by using its public school system to encourage the

recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment clause." 9 Black cited no
cases, instead he relied on history - the history of the controversy over the
Book of Common Prayer, and the history of the adoption of the First Amendment.
"There can, of course, be no doubt that the daily invocation of God's blessing
is a religious activity - the trial court so found, and the Board of Regents,
in its amicus brief, conceded the religious nature of prayer but seeks to distinguish this p~ayer because it is based on our spiritual heritage."lO The
fact that the prayer is "denominationally neutral'' and voluntary, does not

5Ibid. p.423.
6191 N.Y.S. 2d 453, (1959).
7176 N.E. 2d. 579 (1961).
&rhe decision was six-to-one, with neither Justices Frankfurter or White
participating.
9~' op.cit., po424.
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"serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment clause as it might
from the Free Exercise clause •O• .n11 "The Establishment clause, unlike the
Free

Exerci~e

clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental

compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals
12
or not.n
Direct coercion, however, ts not necessary, for, when the "···
power, prestige, and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities
to conform to the prevailing officially-approved religion is plain."13 In
short, n1t is neither irreligious or sacreligious to say that each separate
government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanetigp!!!g official prayers and leave that purely religiov.s :function to the
people's religious leaders." (emphasis supplied) 14 In a footnote that was
frequently overlooked in the first furor over the decision, Black distinguished
between patriotic and ceremonial exercises which contain references to the
Deity, and the "unquestioned religious exercises which- the- State-of New York
had sponsored in this instance. 1115
Black confined his 1ecision to the issue of writing and sanctioning official prayers.

For Justice Douglas, concurring, "the point for decision is

whether the government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise." 16
He was not convinced that authorizillB' the prayer is to "establish" religion in
the strictly historical meaning of those words. A religion is not established
in the usual sense by merely letting those who choose to do so say a prayer
that the ptiblic school teacher leads.

Yet, once a government finances a

11Ibid., p.4300
12Ibid., p.430.

14Ib"d
---1...•,

l3Ibid., p.431.

16 Ibid.,

p~435.

15Ibid., f ootnota 21.

p.437.
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religious exercise, it inserts a divisive influence into our communities. 17 In
his sweeping concurrence, he reaffirmed his famous "we are a religious people ••• "
dictum of Zorach, cited the dissent in McGowan18 that the government is "to have
no interest in theology or ritual" and repudiated his stand in the Everson
case. 19 He implied that a whole series of religious involvements are unconstitutional, including such diverse American "institutions" as the opening prayers
in Congress and the Courts, tax exemptions and deductions, aid to denominational
colleges through the G. I. Bill, etc. 20 He also made it clear that he found no
element of coercion present in the instant case (except perhaps on the teacher;
and no teacher is complaining). 21 In Douglas' view, any financial involvement
by the government is an inconstitutional establishment.

He cited the

Rutl~ge

Everson dissent as durable First Amendment philosophy - p;1blic money devoted
to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings quest for more.
The lone dissenter, Mr. Justice Stewart, discounted the relevancy of the
history cited by the majority.

What was at issue to him was "not the history

of the established church in 16th Century England or 18th Century America, but
the history of the religious tradition of our people •••• 1122 Ina. lengthy
footnote, he cited numerous examples of Presidents and other high officials who,
throughout history, have invoked the aid of the Deity, 23 - and concluded that
24
these actions and practices do not constitute the establishment of religion.
There was no finding that New York had interferred with anyone's Free Exercise
of religion (and implied that his decision would be different i f there had been_
such a finding).

17Ibid., p.442.
1

8McGowan~. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, (1961), p.563. see appendix herein
for summary of decision.
19~, .Ql?.•ill•, pp.442-443. 21 Ibid., p.438. 23 Ibid.
22
24
20Ibid., p.440,f'ootnote 4.
Ibid., p.446.
Ibid., p.450.
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He said,
The Court has misapplied a great constitutional principleo o••
I cannot see how an °official religion' is established by letting
those who want to say a prayer, say it. On the contrary, I think
that to deny the wish of theaa school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the
spiritual heritage of our nation.25
Ile did not consider whether children would "voluntarily" recite a prayer without

the aid, assistance, and encouragement of their teachers and administrators.
26
The last of the school Establishment cases are Schempp and Murray.
These cases, decided together by the Court, arose in Pennsylvania and Maryland,
respectively, under state statutes requiring Bible reading at the commencement
of each school day.

In each instance, the statutes were amended in the course

of the litigation permitting a child's

~xcusal

on parental request.

The

Scheimpps, who were Unitarians, testified :that there we1·e ''religious doctrines

purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible which were contrary to the religious
beliefs which they held and to their familial teaching."

Schempp further testi-

fied that he did not have the children excused from attending the exercises because, among other things, he believed "tmt the children's relationships with
their teachers and classmates would be adversely affected," that the "children
would be labeled as 'odd-balls' ,'t and further, that children were likely to
lump together all particular religious differences and/or objections .. as atheism,
v!il.ch is often connected with atheistic communism. 027 There was also expert
testimony introduced in the lower court that the Bible was of great moral,
literary, and historical value, but that there were significant differences in
the meaning attached to various parts of the Bible by different religious

25~., p.445.
26Abiw,tonSchool District .!.• £:..ct_hempp, and Murray y. Curlett, decided
together in 374 U.S. 203 (1963), herr;inafter referred to as Schempp.
27 Ibid., p.208.
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groups, and that when read without explanation, could be psychologically harmful
28
to a childQ
The Federal District Court, where the action was brought, found
that the reading of the verses "possesses a devotional and religious character
and constitutes, in effect, a religious observance."

In striking down the

statute, the Court also found that the Holy Bible is a Christian-document and
that the practice prefers the Christian religion. 29
The Maryland case was brought by Mrs. Madelyn Murray, a professed atheist,
for her son, William, a student in the Baltimore school system.

She claimed

that the statute was in violation of their rights of "freedom of religion under
the First and Fourteenth Amendment" in that it threatened ''their religious
liberty by placing a premium on belief as against non-belief and

subje~ted

their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority •••• " 30 The respondentA
demurred and the Maryland Trial Court sustained the demurrer, that is, upheld
the validity of the statute. 31 The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a four-tothree decision, affirmed the lower court; 32 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Mr. Justice Clark wrote the opininn of the Court holding that Bible reading

and recitation of prayer in the public schools, even though participation

is "voluntary" constitutes an Establishment of religinn which is prohibited by
the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth. 33 He began

28Ibid., p.209.
29Ibid., p.210. For lower court decisions, see 177 F. Supp. 398, E.D. Pa.,
(1959); 201 F. Supp. 815, (1961).
30Schempp • .2.R•ill•, p.212.
3J..rhe sc}lool board, by demurring, admits all the facts pleaded by the
petitioner - including the fact that the exercise in question is a religious
exercise - but denies the applicability of the law.

32Ibid., p.212, 228 Md. 239, 17~ A 2d 687, (1960).
33Schempp • .QR.cit., p.212.
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his analysis of the problem by reiterating the Zorach dicta "We are a religious
people ••• '' and cited the numerous

evidences of this in our public life; 34 how-

ever, our belief in religious .Liberty is also strong35 and re-affirmed that the
''government is neutralp and while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.•• 36 He went to some length to affirm the Court's position that
the First Amendment "has been made wholly applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment," 37 and that t 1 this Court has rejected unequivocally the
contention that the Establishment clause forbids only governmental preference

of one religion over another.~ This was settled in the Cantwell case, 38 and
re-affirmed in Everson (both by the majority and the dissenters), in McCollum,
in Zora.ch, in ]foGowan Y.• Maryland, Torasco .Y! Watkins39 and Engel. He explained
his reiteration of these well-established principles by

s~ying,

"While ncne of the parties to P.ither of these cases has questioned
these basic conclusions of the Court, ••• others continue to question
their history, logic, and efficiency. Such contentions, in the light
of the consistent interpretations in cases of this Court seem entirely
un-tenable and of value only as academic exercises. 0 40
He further re-affirmed the inter-relationship and duality of the religious
clauses of the First Amendment.

The Establishment clause has been considered

by the Court eight times and it has consistently held that the "clause withdrow
all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereor. 1141

34 Ibid., p.213.

35

.ill<!•, p.214.

36 Ibid .. , p.215. Originally quoted in an Ohio case by Judge Alonzo Taft,
father of Chief Justice Taft.
37Ibid., p.216 .. This is the first time the Court has :found it necessary

to mention incorporation.
38Ibid., p.215, referring to Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 UeS. 296, (1940).
39367

u.s.

488, (1961). Bee appendix herein.

40Schempp • .Q.:eocit., p.117. (The Justices ~ sensitive to public opinion!)
41Ibid., p.222.
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The test is "what are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution ...
To

withstand the strictures of the Establishment clause, there must be secular

legislative purpose and primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion.

The Free Exercise clause withdraws from legislative power the-exertion

of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. 42
In applying the law to the instant facts, Justice Clark found that the

religious character of the exercise was admitted by the State by its ruling
that the Douay version of the Bible may be used and that pupils may be excused
even though the State contended that part of its secular purpose was the promotion of moral values to counteract the materialistic trends of our times, etc.
The conclusion followed that in both cases, the laws required religious exercises and such exercises were being conducted in direct violation of petitioners'
rights. 43 He made it quite clear that a study of the Bible, or of religion,
objectively presented as part of a program of secular education, does not fall
within this prohibition.

He further emphasized that "while the Free Exercise

clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free
exercise to anyone, it never meant that a majority could use the machinery of
the State to practice its beliefs" - citing Justice Jackson in the Barnette
case.

The very purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects

from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the Courts.
Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, agreed that the state could not
conduct a religious exercise without violating the neutrality required of the

42Ibid.

-

43 Ibid., p.223.
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State.

44

But, further, in a -position similar to his stand in Engel, he said

the Establishment clause also forbids the State ttto employ its

f'i1~ilities

or

funds in a way that gives any church or all churches greater strength in our
society than it would have by relying on its members alone." Through the
mechanism of the state, all of the people were required to finance a religious
exercise that only some of the people wanted and that violated the sensibilities
of others; this violated the First Amendment - it is not the amount of the funds
expended, he said, but the use to which they are put. 45

Mr .. Justice Brennan, setting forth .tµ.s views in a separate opinion, joined
fully in the opinion and judgment of the Court.

In a scholarly, detailed, and

thoughtful presentation, Brennan analysed the whole problem of church-state
relationships. Referring to the },ounding Fathers, and pat'ticularly to Madison
and

Jefferson, he reached the crux of the problem when he stated,
I doubt i f their view, even if perfectly clear one way or the other,
would supply a dispositive answer to the question presented by these
cases. A more fruitful inquiry, it ~~ems to me, is whether the
practices here challenge or threaten those consequences which the
Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote th.at
type of interdependence between religion and state which the First
Amendment was designed to prevent.46

A literal quest for the intent of the Founding Fathers is futile because:

1. the historical record is ambiguous, 2. the structure of /.merican education
has greatly changed since the adoption of the First Amendment,

3. our religious

composition makes us vastly more diverse people than our forefathers were, and
4. the American experiment in free public education available to all children
has been guided in large measure by the dramatic evolution of religious· diversities among the population which the public schools se:~e. 47
In reviewing the history of the Court's decisions Ln important State -

44Ibid., p.229.

46 Ibid., pp.235-6.

45Ibid.

47Ibid., pp.236-2400
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Religion cases, Brennan finds that the distinctions between the Hamilton48 and
Barnette cases crucial to the resolution of the present cases - Hamilton dealt
with the voluntary attendance at college of young adults, while Barnette involved the compulsory attendance of young children at elementary and secondary
schools. 49 A discussion of the absorption of the Establishment clause into the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Blaine Amendment led the Justice into a discussion of the duality of the Religion clauses of the First Amendment, and a review of the three cases discussed above which led to the present case.

He

cited the language of the Everson case, carefully pointing out that four of
the Justices disagreed with the result of the case. 50 He rejected the contention that Zorach overruled McCollum in silence, and also noted that they
were not distinguishable in terms of Free Exercise.

The crucial difference

was that McCollum offended the Establishment clause while Zorach did not not because of the public funds which were involved, but rather because the
McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the public school classroom in precisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers of
secular subjects.

"A request from one in authority is understood to be mere

euphemism; it is in fact, a command in an inoffensive form ...5l
The Sunday Law cases, Brennan said, considered the contention that
establishing a uniform day of rest was a violation of the Establishment Clause,
but found that although the purpose was originally a religious one, these laws

~lton .Y• Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
Action brought by conscientious objectors. Issue was whether State could
compel students at State University to participate in military traininginstruction against their religious convictions. Held: compulsory military
training at State University did not violate the right of Free Exercise since
there is neither a constitutional right nor legal obligation to attend the
State University.
50Ibid., p.260.
51 Ibid., p.263.
49schempp, op.cit., p.252.
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were continued in force for reasons wholly secular, 52 and were enforced for
wholly secular objectives which could not be effectively achieved in a modern
society except by designating Sunday a uniform day of rest.

In the Torasco

case, on the other band, although Free Exercise rather than Establishment was
involved, the state attempted to use a religious means for achieving a purely
secular goal; the states' interest in the integrity of its Notary Publics did
not warrant the screening of applicants by a religious testo

Botn cases, there-

fore, stand for the proposition that government may not use religious means to
serve secular interests without the clearest demonstration that non-religious
means will not suffice. Like the prayer in Engel, these exercises are clearly
religious, and, unlike the Sunday closing laws, they have not lost their religious purpose or religious character by the passage of time. 53
Although Brennan could well have stopped at this point, he felt it necessary to discuss three other contentions which bad been raised in the case
and deserved the Court's attention.

The first argument raised was that the

purpose of the exercise was clearly secular; moral and spiritual values were
taught and a solemn exercise inspired better discipline.

"To the extent that

only religious materials will serve this purpose, it seems to me that the purpose, as well as the means is plainly religious, that the exercise is necessarily forbidden by"the Establishment clause." 54 The second argument that
Brennan refuted was that the practices involved were unobjectionable because
they preferred no sect at the expense of the others - in fact, the practices
did prefer some sects over the others - there are too many different views on
how the Bible, which is a sectarian book, should be read and studied; and "even
if the Establishment clause were oblivious to non-sectarian religious practices, I think it quite likely that the 'common core' approach would be

53Ibid., p.278.
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sufficiently objectionable to many groups to be foreclosed by the prohibitions
of the Free Exercise clause." The third element to be considered was that provisions for excusal were made.

Once it was found that these practices were

essentially religious, the availability of excusal or exemption had no relevance
to the Establishment question; further, the excusal procedures necessarily
operated in such a way as to violate the right of Free Exercise by requiring,
in effect, a profession of disbelier.5 5

Brennan cited extensive studies of

behavioral scientists concerning the effect of similar situations upon childreno56 The final contention of the school officials that the Court, by invalidating these exercises, would have to declare eve-ry vestige of cooperation between religion and government unconstitutional, he rejected summarily.
nReligious exercises in the schools present a unique problem.

For not every

involvement of religion in life violates the Establishment clause." The test
of what is forbidden under the Establishment clause is those involvements with
secular institutions which (a) serve essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental
aims where secular means would suffice.57
After making it very clear that the practices complained of in the instant
case violated the Establishment clause, Justice Brennan explained in some detail the forms of accomodation between government and religion which showed
government neutrality and not hostility to religion. 58 A. Where there is a
conflict between Establishment and Free Exercise; for example, when the government has deprived individuals of their right of Free Exercise, such as in penal
institutions or military installations, the government may provide chaplains

55 Ibid., p.288.

57 Ibid., po295.

56Ibid.,

58Ibid., p .. 298.
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without violating the Establishment clause. Therefore, this is distinguishable
from sponsoring daily prayer and Bible reading in elementary and secondary
schools in that, in the former situation, there is no element of coercion present and involves adults, not children. 59 B. Devotional exercises in Legislative
bodies - again dealing with mature adults, 60 he added that this could well be a
"political question" since the Constitution makes each House monitor of its own
Rules. 61 C. The non-devotional use of the Bible in public schools is certainly
not foreclosed by the decision - nor are the propriety of tax exemptions or
deductions which incidentally benefit the religious institutions in question;
nor are religious considerations in public welfare programs, and/or activities
which although originally religious in origin, have lost their religious significance. 62 This latter point would, in the Justice's opinion, serve to insulate from the application of the First Amendment such things as "In God We
Trust•• and patriotic exercises which invoke the name of the Deity. 63

Mr. Justice Goldberg, with Mr. Justice Harlan, submitted still another
concurring opinion.
of

They, too, joined completely in the opinion and judgement

the Court, but added a caveat; the two parts of the First Amendment are to

be read together in the light of the single purpose they are designed to serve the promotion and assurance of the fullest possible scope of religious liberty
and tolerance for all, and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope
of attainment of that end~ 64 Not all involvements of government and religion
are prohibited; there are required and permissible accomodations between
government and religion - the Schempp case does not fall within such permissible

59Ibid., p.299.

60
Ibid., po300.

61Ibid., p.301. This issue could only be raised by a member of Congress,
quite unlikely if the Congressman expected to be re-elected.
62Ibid., p.301, et.seq.

63J.Qii.

64Ibid., p.305.
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accommodation.

The state has organized its facilities to engage in an unmis-

takable religious practice, during the curricular day, involving young impressionable children, whose attendance is compelled; and has utilized the prestige, power, and influence of the school administration staff and authority this is not simply an accommodation. 65 This, he said, is the holding of the
Court, and no more.

Practices which. do not create any of the dangers the

Amendment is designed to prevent, and do not involve the state in religious
exercises, are not prohibited; 66 each case will be decided individually "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to
distinguish between real threat and mere shadow. 1167
Mr. Justice Stewai-t, the lone dissenter, would have remanded the cases
for the taking of additional evidence, before he could judge whether the
Establishment clause had necessarily been violated (he commented parenthetically that neither of the complainants raised the issue of Establishment,

b~t rather alleged violations of their religious liberty). 68 Historically, the
church and state interact in numerous ways, and, although in many cases the two
clauses in the First Amendment complement each other, there are areas where a
doctrinaire reading of the Establishment clause would be in irreconcilable
conflict with the Free Exercise clause. 69 It is, in his view, a fallacious
oversimplification of the meaning of the First Amendment to regard them as a
single constitutional standard of' "separation of' church and state." Stewart
felt that there was a substantial Free Exercise claim on the part of those who
affirmatively desire to have their children's school day open with passages
from the Bible; 70 compulsory state schooling structures a child's life so that
he does not get religion in school, Stewart said, religion, therefore, is

65Ibid., p.305.

67Ibid., p.306.

69 Ibid., p.309.

66Ibid., p.306.

68Ibid., p.309.

?Oibid., p.312.
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placed at a disadvantage. 71 He also raised a point of judicial construction
which had not been mentioned in some time in connection with Bill of Rights
oases - that is that the Court is "under a duty to interpret these provisions
so as to render them constitutional if reasonably possible.n72 Without coercion
on the part of pupils to participate, there is no establishment, according to
Stewart.*

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p.316 •

...

The cases reviewed above are the principal cases involving the schools
and religion. There are several other recent occasions in which the Court
further discusses the religion clauses that are significant in any study of
this subject. They are briefly reviewed in the Appendix herein.

Chapter V

LEARNED CRITICS
The problems which have confronted the Court in these cases are not only
constitutional and philosophical, but alsQ highly emotional and controversial.
The comments of prominent writers in the field are illustrative of tJie complexity and diversity of' opinion with which_the Court is faced. "'There are two conflicting theories regarding the interpretation of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment which several Justices seem to have taken into account, but
have not clearly articulated. Many writers have also considered this conflict
but have not been able to express it definitively. Edmund Cahn of New York
University School of Law refers to the two views as the Jeffersonian Enlightenment view and the Madisonian - Dissenter view. 1 Under the Jeffersonian,' or "narrow" view, the Establishment clause has no vitality of its own, but
exists merely to implement the .Free Exercise clause, while under the Madisonian, or "broad" view, Establishment not only implements Free Exercise but also
is a self-sufficient imperative "meriting the most scrupulous obedience because
it safeguards the purity of organized religion itself • 112 In other words, it
represents the right of organized religion to be independent of the state and of
the state to be independent of organized religion.

10Misunderstanding of the.Establishment Clause," 36 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1277.
(1961). His exact reasons for assigning these names escape this writer, but
they do serve as convenient "handles."
2Ibid., p.1278.,

Under the first view, an Establishment exists when any act of government
iilterferee or abridges in any way the free exercise of an individual's religious beliefs - but the element of interference with Free Exercise must be
present.

This seems to be the approach taken by the dissent in both Engel and

Schempp.

Following this theory, prayers in schools, and non-discriminatory and

impartial aid, financial or otherwise, to all religious institutions would be
constitutional. Under the second theory,

~involvement

of government in

religious activity would constitute Establishment and come within the prohibition of the First Amendment.

This would be true whether the involvement came

through taxation or by virtue of the power and prestige of government, and
whether or not it interfered with Free Exercise. This view, carried to its
logical conclusion, would not only prohibit tax aid to religious institutions,
but also tax exemptions, and probably such things as ttin God We Trust" on coins,
"under God 11 in the flag salute, etc.

Professor Wilber G. Katz 3 would add a

third interpretation of the First Amendment, which he refers to as the principle of neutrality, and which he summarizes as "no help unless no help would
be harm." 4 In other words, a State cannot be actively hostile towards religion, but rather be benevolently neutral in religious matters.

This is a

middle ground which would prohibit direct aid to any religious institution,
but would not interfere with the present tax structure and references to the
Deity in public life.
The Court has not espoused any of these views completely, although the
language of the cases, i f not the decisions themselves, would bring them
closer to the

positio~

of neutrality suggested by Professor Katz.

The learned

3Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, former Dean, University of
Chicago School of Law, statement and testimony before Judiciary Committee,
Hearings, pp.813-819.
4Ibid., p.818.
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critics are divided in their opinions along these same lines. They cite the
Founding Fathers, particularly Madison and Jefferson; they discuss the various
meanings of ..religion," "sectarian, .. and "church,u and no one has had difficul ty finding convincing authority to support his particular stand.

The charge

of being "result-oriented" is often leveled at the Court - in this subject it
could well be leveled at the critics; their
cision rather than the reasons.

dissatisfactio~

is aimed at the de-

In reading the many Law Review Articles, books,

and magazine articles, one gains the impression that each writer had a preconceived idea of what the result should be and then supported it. This is most
understandable, for the subject of religion is very personal, very emotional,
and not necessarily rational - it can be quite difficult to divorce one's prejudices from an objective study of what the "law'' is, and what it should be. The
Writers do agree, however, that the cases taken as a whole offer no real pattern
or guide for the future.
Cahn is probably the most articulate exponent of the Madisonian - Dissenter
view5 based on philosophical, ethical, moral, and historical grounds. The First
.Amendment calls for a complete separation of church and state.

In light of the

background, the Engel decision was as predictable as the judicial process ever
can be. 6 The decision was almost unanimous as compared to the school bus case
and the Sunday closing laws, because the subject matter was purely religious
and uncomplicated by questions of economics or public safety; he agrees, too,
that the idea of a non-denominational prayer is fallacious - that the expression is a contradiction in terms. Many other constitutional scholars agree with
Cahn. For example, Louis Pollack states, "By placing the decision on the

5Ed.mund Cahn, "On Government and Prayer," 37 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 981, (1962).
6

12!!!·, p.986.
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Establishment clause, the court evidenced a high order of responsibility. 117
This reflects the Everson view set forth by Rutledge, which he feels will
ultimately prevail~ 8 "By design, the religious freedom clauses were designed
to protect minority religious groups and non-believers from the majority. 119
Philip Kurland10 agrees that "establishment" does not rest on compulsion, but
questions the majority's reliance on history (since no cases were cited) because he argues that historical arguments are not really valid unless it is
assumed that 0 due process" is static. 11 Leo Pfeffe; (counsel for the .AmericanJewish Congress, and for the plaintiffs in several of the above cases) also
takes the view that there "is a distinction in conceptual foundation of the two
clauses" that practical as well as ideological considerations were involved in
creating a complete separation of church and state. 12
Many

critics take the other view - (one is reminded of the parable of the

elephant and the three blind men - each man found what he waslooking for!).

It

is interesting, but not too surprising, that the articles in the Catholic Law
Reviews generally adopt the narrower interpretation of the religion clauses of

7Louis H. Pollack, "Public Prayers in Public Schools," 77 Harv. L.R. 62,
(1963). p.70.

8Louis H. Pollack, 0 W.B.R. Some Reflections," 71 Yale L.R. 1451,(1961),
p. 1456.

9Harry N. Rosenfeld, "Separation of Church and State in Public Schools,"
22 U. of Pitto L.R. 561, (1960), p.562. An excellent article which objectively
reviews the history of church-state relationships in the courts, the purpose
of the First in the light of our history, and concludes that complete separation
is called for.
lOh Supreme ~ Reyiew, Philip Kurland, ed.; Chicago, U. of Chic. Press,
(1962) • The Regents' Prayer Case; "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying ••• " p. 3.

11Ibid., p.22.
12Leo Pfeffer and F. X. O'Neill, "The Meaning of the Establishment Clause A Debate," 2 Buf. L.. R. 225, (1953), p.228. See also Pfeffer, "Court, Constitution, and Prayer," 16 Rutgers L.R. 735, (1962).
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the First Amendment. 13 It is even more interesting that those who support the
"broad" view make the point that the Bible is a sectarian book, and that there
is no such thing as a non-sectarian prayer. This point seems to have been
"overlooked~

by the proponents of the "narrow" view.

Paul G. Kauper, of the University of Michigan Law Schoo1, 14 applauds the
narrowness of the Engel decision, asserting that the case does not outlaw
prayer.

'

(This same point was emphasized by others although it should have been

obvious that the prayer was "outlawed" because it was a religious and devotional
exercise.) He agrees with the New York Court of Appeals' decision that the
Regent's prayer was permissible as long as those objecting were protected, and
cites with approval the Chief Justice of that court that "'it is a fundamental
rule of interpretation that the sense of the nation at the time of the adoption'
of the amendment be taken into accollll.t, and that 'prayer is an integral part of
our national heritage'".l5 Kauper further states that non-discriminatory financial aid to parochial schools would be constitutional, since the government
can and does impose educational standards on them.

Charles B. Nutting16 agrees,

but does not feel that the Court will accept this view in light of the Engel
case. This distresses him because "it is clear that originally in the American
Colonies religion was a matter of government concern" and that "the encouragement and strengthening of religion through government action is a part of the
cultural heritage of this country.n (!) 17
Still a third school of thought would have had the Court duck the issue in

l3See 31 Ford. L.Revo 201, (1962); 31 Geo. Wash. L.R. 497, (1962);
11 Loyola L.R. 358, (1962-3); 46 Marq. L.R. 233, (1962-3),
l4t1Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court," 61 Mich. L..R. 1031,(1963).
15Ibid., p.1034.
160some Reflections on the Positive State," 49 Va. L.R. 729, p.733,(1963).
17Ibid., P• 736.
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one way or another. One writer, comparing the American Federal system to that
of Switzerland, 18 sees the problem as one of federalism, and suggests that the
Establishment clause should not be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
and that the Court has done so without reference to Cardozo's "ordered
liberty.1t 19 Establishment does not define an individual freedom, O'Brian says,
but was merely intended to be a restriction on the Central government; establishment can exist without infringing on religious liberty, in fact, religious
coercion has not occurred in America. 20 Arthur Sutherland of Harvard, 21 one of
the few authorities who feels that the court arrived at the right result for the
wrong reasons, would have preferred that the case have been decided on the basis
of available precedent, that is, on Free Exercise. The new approach under
Establishment opens the door and obliges the court to pass on the validity of
comparatively insignificant manifestations of religious activity in public
education. He would advise the Court to exercise judicial restraint - in fact,
the Court should have refused the suit on the grounds of di minimus - (certainly one might apply the doctrine of 9&,minimus to some religious expressions
in public schools, but it would seem to this student that an activity which is
repeated daily becomes more of a mountain than a molehill), and he advocates
the same restraint on the part of other governmental bodies, including school
boards. Dean Erwin Griswold22 cites his colleague with approval. He feels

18Fr. William O'Brian, "The Engel Case From A Swiss Perspective," 61 Mich.
L.R. 1069, (1963).
19Ibid., 1083.
20Ibid., p.1083, footnote #75. but see Boles, ll•ill•, p.177; Blanchard,
.QJ?.cit., p.33; Hearings, op.cit., pp. 2036, 1060, 447, etc.
21 ttEstablishment According to Engel," 76 Harv. L.R. 25, (1962).
22Erwin N. Griswold, 0 Absolute is in the Dark - A Discussion of the Approach
of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions," 8 Utah L.R. 167 (1963) cited in
Hearings, p.1017.
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that this was a local matter which the court should not have considered.

In

accordance with the Barnette decision, as long as participation is voluntary,
a non-believer can refrain. He disagrees with.the social scientists who assert
that the school situation creates compulsion - as a matter of fact, the disbeliever is different, and might as well get used to being so considered.
Others defining religion narrowly, argue that it was the intent of the
Framers to place all religions on an equal footing, that "Establishment" .

simply means that there be no national church. 23 Still others believe that
in using the historical approach, the Court did not take into account the underlying policy of the Establishment clause - which is to eliminate divisiveness and that the exact meaning will depend on the circumstances since what is
divisive in one situation will not be in another. 24 Wilber Katz takes the
position that religion is only free when it is free of coerced support as well
as coercive restrictions, and that strict separation actually reduces the area
of religious freedom. 25 He feels that the reason for the involvement of the
American Civil Liberties Union and other such organizations, despite the resulting restraint of religious liberty, is fear of the Roman Catholic Church as a
threat to potential religious freedom, since a Catholic state would not permit
dissenting groups to carry on general propaganda.

26

A unique and most intelligent approach to the problem of the meaning of
Establishment was presented in the Tulane Law Review in 1963.

It analyzed

those activities which are nearly universal in countries which do have an

L.R.

23James F. Janz, "Church and State; Prayer in Public Schools," 46 Marq.
234, (1962).
·
24student note, 16 Vand. L.R. 205, (1963).

25Wilber Katz, "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality," 20 U. of Chi.
L.R. 426, p.433, (1953).
26~., p.436.
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established church. 27 Where there is an established church, t4e government
Prescribes prayers and forms of worship.
2. Exercises some control over the appointment of church officers.
3. Requires religious instructions in public schools.
4. Pays the salary of clergy or otherwise subsidizes church.
5. Requires the chief of state or others to profess a certain faith.28

1.

In the United States, there has been controversy over all but the second!

The

argument that prayer in the schools is based on our spiritual heritage is
probably the most damaging one that can be made because the "preservation and
use of national spiritual heritage is the raison d'etre for the establishment
of state churches." The First Amendment goes further than merely prohibiting
the establishment of a church - it provides there is to be no establishment of
religion, thus effectively removing it from the political domain.
The Court has not espoused any of these views completely, although the
language of the Establishment cases, if not the decisions themselves, would
bring the majority of the Court close to the position of benevolent neutrality
suggested by Professor Katz, with Justice Stewart adopting the narrow position
that interference with Free Exercise must be shown, and Douglas embracing the
strict separation.

27student note,37 Tul- L.R.124, (1963), p.127.
28Ibid.

Chapter IV
PROGNOSIS
Predicting the Court, like ranking the Presidents, has long been a favorite
sport of political scientists - professionals and amateurs alike. This writer,
too, has succumbed to the lure of the game.

The critics of the Court seem to

agree that the Court has not set forth guidelines for the future because the
Court has not clearly defined Establishment.

Despite the apparent lack of a

definition, I feel the Court has indicated the course it will follow.

The

Court, after all, rarely draws a blueprint, but traditionally decides issues on
a case by case basis, each decision building on the preceeding one.
It is clear from the five principal cases discussed herein - and from the
Jehovah's Witnesses cases - that Free Exercise is the right to practice or not
to practice one's religion without interference from government.

The Court

indicates that there is a difference between Free Exercise and Establishment,
but has not spelled out that difference. The cases discussed herein represent
the two sides of the freedom of religion coin - the Everson case involving
public tax support of religious schools, and the others involving religious
activity in tax-supported public schools; the decisions in all five were based
on the Establishment clause.

There was no Establishment found in Everson be-

cause the spending of tax funds to provide buses for parochial school pupils
served a public purpose which only incidentally benefited the religious institutions.

In McCollum and Zorach, both involving released time, the existence

of Establishment was determined by the use of tax funds to support religious
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activity; on-premises released time was held to be such a use of tax funds as to
constitute Establishment, while off-premises released time was not an Establishment because it did not involve the use of tax funds.

In Engel and Schempp, the

Regents• prayer, Bible reading, and the recitation of the Lord's prayer - all
clearly religious activities - were held to constitute an Establishment because
they were conducted on a systematic basis, on public school property, and sponsored by public school authorities. The use of tax funds to support a religious activity, the use of public property and public authority to support or
promote a religious activity; these, at the very least, constitute Establishment.
In the last four of these cases, the issue of Free :b"'xer.cise was also raised

by plaintiffs, but in each case Free Exercise was considered irrelevant and
immaterial and the Establishment clause controlling. Dicta would indicate that
where the Court finds Establishment, it is not necessary to.prove that the right
to Free Exercise has been abridged. 1 However, the majority in each of these
cases indicates that the school situation itself creates a compulsion which
does abridge the right of Free Exercise, even though participation is "voluntary. "2 It is this point which separates the majority from the minority.

The

dissenters in each case agree that if there were proof of actual coercion on
the pupils to participate, there would be an unconstitutional activity.

The

minority demands proof; the majority in effect takes "judicial notice•• of the
compulsory nature of the school situation.

1see Black, ~, -2.R•.ill.•, p.430; Brennan, Schempp, _Q,R.ci t., p.298;
the dissent in Zorach, -2.R•sit·• p.320; and the majority in_McCollum, .QR.cit.,
pp.227,230.
21 remember rather vividly from my grammar school days in Pennsylvania,
the taunts and teasing inflicted on a classmate who was a member of Jehovah's
Witnesses, and refused to salute the flag. Despite the compulsory flag-salute
law (this was pre-Barnette), the teacher permitted this student to remain
seated - but the other children never for a moment let her forget that she
was diffeJ"ent, and odd.
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It would appear that the difference between the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses is that the former involves negative or reetaining action on
religion or religious beliefs, while the latter involves positive support of
religion.

Government attempts to interfere with an individual's beliefs would

be a violation of Free Exercise; government promotion of a particular set of
beliefs (i.e. religion as opposed to non-religion) would violate the Establishment clause.

Although it is somewhat of an over-simplification, it would not

be inaccurate to say that Free Exercise tends to protect the "b<>liever," no
matter how odd his beliefs may be, and Establishment tends to protect the "nonbeliever," whether it be non-belief in religion in general or in a particular
religion.

The question then remains, is there an attempt to put the weight and

authority of the government behind the support of religiont or posed in another
way, who is sufficiently "injured" to have standing to sue?
/Theoretically, Establishment can stand alone, without coercion; however,
where there is no showing that the plaintiff personally has been injured, there
is no way to attack such a practice.

In those instances in wlrl.ch the plaintiff

can show that he has been injured by an activity of the government, the Court
is likely to find Establishment where a religious activity is at issue - of
course, by showing injury, plaintiff also shows that his right of Free Exercise
has been violated.

For example, if the Hamilton case3 were decided today, the

Court would probably hold that plaintiff could not be denied the right to attend
the state university because of his religious conviction and, therefore, compulsory military training would be a violation of plaintiff's right of Free
Exercise, and unconstitutional as to him.

Compulsory chapel attendance at a

state university would undoubtedly be held to be an Establishment, and consequently, a prohibited activity; in order to have a standing to sue, however,

3see p.80 herein.
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plaintiff would have to show that his beliefs were violated - his right to Free
Exercise was abridgedo On the other handp non-compulsory chapel at a government
supported university could not be challenged because no one is injured sufficiently to have a standing to sue. Many practices which might be considered
Establishment are simply immune from attack under the Mellon __y._Massachusetts
doctrine.
As a practical matter, the Supreme Court has settled the issue of religious

activity in public life. Despite widespread predictions that the Justices would
prohibit the singing of "America" by students; remove "In God WA·Trust 11 from
coins; and ban the daily invocations in Congress, the Oourt has not done so. 4
The Court refused to review a decision of the New York Court of Appeals, holding that the inclusion of the words 11Under God.. in the pledge of allegiance did

not constitute an Establishment, 5 and also refused to review another New York
decision in which the United States Court of .t\ppeals ruled that school officials
had the power to ban "voluntary" prayers in public nursery schools. 6
The other side of the coin, actual tax support for religious institutions,
presents a much more difficult problem to the Court... There are two facets to
this problem; 1) tax exemptions to religious institutions, and 2) outright tax
aid to such institutions, the latter by far the most troublesome.

On October 10,

1966, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a Maryland case7 brought by

4For a comprehensive list of the "religious" activities of the government,
see Justice Douglas, concurring opinion, Schempp, .QJ?•.ei!,., p.440, footnote 4.
5Lewis v. Allen, Commissioner of Education of New York, 379 U.S. 923
(1964), cert-:- denied.
6New IQE]£ ~. July 8, 1965, p.33 _ U . S . _ (1965) concerning the
children's grace "God is great, God is good," etc., said before juice and
cookies.
7Murray .I• Controller JU: .1Wl Treasury #133, _
(1966).

U.s.

_

17 L ed 2d 55
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Mrs. Madalyn Murray O'Hare - the plaintiff in the Maryland Bible reading case who contended that tax exemptions for houses and buildings "used exclusively for
public worship" amounted to an indirect subsidy to religious institutions, and
was, therefore, a violation of the Establishment clause.

Plaintiffs claimed

that as taxpayers they were forced unfairly to pa.y a larger share of the taxes
because churches which used public services failed to pa.y their share of the
cost.

The lower court held that the plaintif'fs - atheists - had standing to

sue, but dismissed the action on the merits.

The Maryland Court of Appeals

affirmed the lower court, saying that such "time-honored" exemptions are not
an Establishment.

To the extent that religious property is exempt, there may

be an indirect subsidy, but in Maryland sixty other types of charities also
have exemptions, and the major part of church work is charitable. 8
The Court's refusal to review the case does not necessarily mean that the
Justices agree that such exemptions are constitutional, but, merely that for
its own reasons, it did not see fit to review the matter.

The Court will prob-

ably maintain this position until it is "forced" by a conflict in the circuits,
to consider the question.9 Should the matter come before the Court, the Court
could duck the issue by holding under the Mellon doctrine, that the interest of
any single taxpayer was so nominal that no one had standing to sue.

Such a de-

cision would apply only to federal taxes, and allow state court decisions as to
state taxes to stand. Should the Court decide the issue on the merits, it seems
likely that the tax exemptions would be upheld on the grounds that, 1) to refuse
exemptions to churches while granting to all other charitable, eleemosynary,
and educational institutions would be showing hostility to religion rather than

C\turray x_.. Comptroller~~ Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A. 2d 897 (1966).
9For a list of exemptions granted by the Federal government, see testimony
of Congressman Derounian, Hearings, .Qll•.ill•, p.644.
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neutrality, 2) refusal to grant an exemption would be a violation of 0 equal protection of the laws," and 3) since there is no coercion or support of a particular set of beliefs, no Establishment exists.
Tax grants to religious schools - at all levels - will present the Court
with its most difficult problem in this area.

The provisions of the Aid to

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 will undoubtedly provide the
vehicle for testing this issue. This bill, a compromise care:f'ully tailored to
avoid the church-state issue, provides - instead of general aid to elementary
and secondary schools for teachers' salaries and building construction, (which
probably would have been stalled by those advocating aid to parochial and private schools) for shared time, community oriented educational programs, such as
remedial reading and pre-school programs, and grants for purchase of educational
and instructional materialso Many Congressmen, for reasons political or otherwise, have questioned the constitutionality of this bill; however, an amendment, 10 proposed by Senator Samuel Ervin of North Carolina, allowing a federal
taxpayer's suit (to overcome the Mellon case~ minimus ruling) was defeated by
a coalition of Northern Democrats and liberal Republicans.

It can be tested,

however, on a provision which allows the states to sue the Commissioner of
Education for withholding funds, or through the State courts.

How it will be

tested is not certain, but that it will be tested, there is no question.
The final decision of the Court in this matter will no doubt rest on the
Everson case - either the decision itself, relying on the child-benefit theory,
or on the language of the case which erected the "wall of separation" between
church and state.

In this area, the facts are all important, the way the case

is presented will be controlling.

It is the ,.child-benefit" theory on which

the Federal Aid to Education Bill was predicated. As Justice Rutledge pointed

1<\iew York Times, April 10, 1965, p.l.

---
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out in his Everson dissent, 11 the claim that support is to education and not
religion because education is a public function does not deny that both the
individual and the school are benefited directly and substantially.
Th.is approach, if valid, supplies a ready method for nullifying
~ne Amendment's guaranty, ••• the only thing needed is for the
Court to transplant 'public welfare - public function• view from
its proper non-religious due process bearing to First Amendment
applicationol2
Congressional findings of the public purpose to be served by giving every child
a good education will be persuasive, and if, to paraphrase the minority in
Everson, there is no religious test used in selecting the recipients of public
funds, this may be controlling as to certain parts of the Bill.

For example,

after-school community centers for remedial reading would appear to have no
connection with the religious institution which the child may attend during
school hours.
On the other hand, grants for text-books, and other materials actually
used in the parochial schools would seem to be such use of tax funds which
would constitute an Establishment.

In this instance, as Mr. Justice Goldberg

said in the Schempp case, each case will be decided individually on its facts,
for, "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness
to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow." 13 In deciding on a case
by case basis, the Court might well follow another recent Maryland Court of
Appeals decision14 which involved state grants to four church-affiliated
colleges.

11Everson, .QJ?o,illo, pp.56-58.
12Ibid.
13schempp, .QJ?•ill•, p.306.
14norace ~ League of the United States of America, Inc • .!.• Board of
Public Works .Q! Ma:tyland, 242 Md. 645, 220 A 2d. 51 (1966).
.

101

The Horace Mann League of the United States challenged state grants for
buildings to four church affiliated colleges; the trial court upheld all the
grants, holding that their basic purpose and effect was secular and not religious.

The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a four-three decision, reversed as to

three of the colleges. 15 The grant to the fourth college, Hood, affiliated
with the United Church of Christ, was upheld because "we are unable to say that
the college is sectarian in the legal sense,~ 16 and went on to say that nthe
matter of what is sectarian is rather elusive, being somewhat ephemeral in
nature." The Court cited Douglas' dictum that the most effective way to establish an institution is to finance it, used the language of Everson to say that
tax funds cannot be used to support an institution which teaches the tenets and
faith of any church, nor can an individual be excluded :from the benefits of
valid public welfare legislation because of his faith or lack of it; 17 and the
Brennan language of Sdlempp "if a statute furthers both secular and religious
ends, an examination of the means used is necessary to determine whether the
state could have reasonably attained the secular end by means which do not
further the promotion of religion.n 18 The Court set forth the following criteria for determining whether or not an institution was sectarian: 1) the stated
purpose of the college, 2) college personnel - administration, faculty governing
board, and student body - with emphasis on substantiality of religious control,
3) place of religion in college program, 4) relationship to sponsoring religious organization including extent of ownership, financial assistance and control, 5) results of the college's program such as accreditation and nature of
activities of alumni, and, 6) work and image of the college in the community.
The Court concluded that under these criteria, Hood was non-sectarian, while

15western Maryland-Methodist; Notre Dame and St. Joseph's - Roman Catholic.
~
·
U
IB.
Horace Mann .I· Board, .Q.2.Cit., p.66.
ill!·, p.63.
~., p.61.
LIBRARY
UN!VERS!TY OP RICJ-.fMOND
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Western Maryland College was "sectarian in the legal sense under the.First
Amendment and may not constitutionally receive the grants named in the Bi11. 1119
Among other things, its charter required that one-third of the Board be Methodist ministers so as to give the clergy a veto; the Board was heavily Methodist
and nearly all Protestant; the faculty was committed to a Christian philosophy;
and an atheist would not be employed..

As

to the two Catholic colleges, whose

student bodies were 97 to 100 percent Catholic, the Court said "the whole life
is lived in a Catholic atmosphere which assumes earthly life is to be lived in
preparation for future life with God." 20 Granting aid to the above colleges
would be using the coercive power of the state to materially aid religion. The
dissenting judges, on the other hand, were of the opinion that grants to build
a dining ball and science buildings were not an Establishment of religion. 21
Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the decision but the Supreme Court
refused to review, with Justices Stewart and Harlan indicating that the cases
should have been set down for consideration. 22
The Maryland Court accepted the fact that the institution benefited from
the tax aid, regardless of the purpose of the aid.

Where the institution was

a sectarian religious institution, the Court found that the coercive power of
the state served to materially aid that institution. A religious means (grants

19Ibid., pp.68-9.
20

Ibid. , p. 71.

21.rhe majority left the door open when they said that the legislature was
prohibited from taxing except for a public purpose, and Maryland has not yet declared universal higher education a public purpose of the state. The Court also
indicated that the case was decided under the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
''law of the land" provision, it was the equivalent of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment which included the First Amendment. pp.7'3-76.

~oard of Public ~ of Mar:yland .!." Horace Mann League of ~ United
States of America, Inc .. cert. denied #473, November 14, 1966 _ U.s._,
17 L. ed 2d 195 (1966); Horace~ League .!.• Board .Q! Public Works, appeal
dismissed #590, November 14, 1966, _U.S._, 17 L ed 2d 195 (1966).
2
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to sectarian colleges) was used to attain a secular purpose (promote higher
education), which could have been attained through secular means (grants to
non-sectarian colleges), therefore, a public purpose was not served.
11

The

child-benefit 11 theory is a most appealing one, and if the child can be com-

pletely divorced from the institution, the Supreme Court could properly find
that a public purpose is being served. However, where a religious institution
materially benefits from the coercive taxing power of the state, regardless of
the benefit to the individual, there would appear to be an Establishment of
religion in violation of the First Amendment.

This approach follows the spirit

of the First Amendment, as well as the Court's own precedents as set forth in
McCollum,

~.

Schempp, and the dicta in. Everson.

EPILOGUE

Controversies over the relationship of church and state have plagued
society from the beginning of recorded history. The Founding Fathers, in the
Constitution and Bill of Rights, attempted to define that relationship for the
United States.

In the first part of this paper, I have cited every mention of

religion in the fundamental documents of the New Nation.
is that there was very little discussion of religion.

The fact of the matter

Can we, or should we try

to ascertain the intention of the Founding Fathers from this meager evidence?
Every man, being a different and distinct individual, unavoidably
has intentions somewhat different from those of every one else.
Such a thing as a solid, completely unified intention of all the
members in any group would be hard if not impossible to find.l
To cite the words of
many

~Iadison

or Jefferson as embodying the intentions of the

men who participated in these deliberations, is not only inaccurate but

misleading.

To attempt to assign specific intentions to these men with regard

to prayers and Bible reading, school buses, etc., is equally misleading.
Intentions are highly subjective and personal things. They are not
like badges pinned to a coat lapel. They lie deep in the hearts and
minds of men. They are not always clearly stated by those who have
them, nor even capable of clear and specific formulation. The words
used to convey them seldom do so perfectly.2

1w1111am Anderson, ttintention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional
Interpretation,•t 49 Am. Pol. Sci, Rev. 34, (1955).
2

Ibid.
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Although we cannot ascertain exact intentions, we can find broad general principles in the words they used. The spirit of independence and liberty, the
freedom from compulsion, the resentment of domination by an external imposed
power, the equality of man, and the firm belief that every man has the right
to choose for himself the pattern of his belief - these ideas are implicit in
every word they wrote and said.

These ideas should be the guidelines in any

problem which affects the "inalienable rights of man." Today's Supreme Court
ls following in the tradition of the Founding Fathers in protecting those
rightse
Interpretation of the religion clauses of the Constitution is at issue
today precisely because the exact intentions of the Framers are not clear.
The Supreme Court had no precedent to guide it in 1947 when it decided the
Everson case. The Court, however, has developed guidelines for the nation in
that most sensitive area involving man and religion - based not on the specific
words of the Constitution, but on that same spirit of freedom and liberty that
guided the Founding Fathers almost two hundred years ago.

APPENDIX
There are three other recent Supreme Court decisions which, although not
directly concerning the schools, do have a bearing on the interpretation of the
Establishment clause of the First Amendment. The first of these is another

~laryland case, Torasco

.!.o Watkins, decided in 1961.

1 Roy Torasco, elected a

Notary Public, refused to take the compulsory oath of office 8.ffirming his belief in God as required by the Maryland Constitution, and was denied his commission. Justice Black, speaking for e unanimous Court (with Frankfurter and
Harlan concurring in the result), repeated ani reaffirmed the definition of
Establishment set forth in the Everson case, and added, "Neither State nor
Federal governments can constitutionally pass laws nor impose requirements
which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the existance of God as against those religions
2
founded on different beliefs." He said the power and authority of the State
of Maryland are put on the side of a particular sort of believers - that is,
those who profess belief in God, but the State cannot constitutionally force a
person to "profess belief or disbelief in any religion. 3 It is not clear, however, whether the decision is based on Establishment or Free Exercise, since

1367 U.S. 488 (196l)o The Constitutions of five other States required
atheistic tests; Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Tennesseeo
2
Ibid., po492.

Justice Black argued the former, but concluded that the test unconstitutionally
invaded appellant's freedom of belief o

In the Conscientious Objector cases4 the Court had before it a section of
the Selective Service Act which granted exemption from military duties to those
who objected because of their "religious training and beliefs... This was defined in the Act as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any hmnan relation, but fi.ot
includin.g/" essentially political, sociological, or philosophical means or a
merely personal code... The statute had been amended by Congress in 1940 from
0

Belief in God" to "Belief in a Supreme Being." The Act was attacked as being

a violation of both the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses. The Court upheld the statute, and found that all three of the young men, none of whom professed to a belief in a Supreme Being, were eligible for exemptions from
military service.

In so holding, the Court said the test is "whether a given

belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in. the life of its
pocessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for exemption." 5 By so deciding, the Court avoided a constitutional question, and broadened the definition of religious beliefs so as
to include those which are non-deistico Had Congress not changed the statute,
the Court might well have found an Establishment under Torasco.
6
.
In the Sunday Closing ,W cases which preceeded Engel and Schempp by a
year, the Sunday closing laws of several states were
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses.

4uos. v., Sew,
850, (1965)7

c~llenged

under both the

It was claimed that by requiring

.!!.& .!.• Jakobson, ~ i· U.S., _U.S. _ , 85 Sup.Ct.

5Ibid.
6r.icGowan v.
land, 366 UoS. 420, (1961); Two Guys .!.• McGinle}, (Pa.)
366 UoS., 582, \1961 ; Gallagher.!.• Crown Kosher Super Market, (Mass. , 366
u.s. 617, (1961).
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businesses to be closed on Sunday, the tenets of Christianity were imposed on
the communityo 7 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, rejected this
contention. In a rather fuzzy decision, he conceded that Sunday laws were originally religious in character - the issue before the Court was whether they were
still religious in charactere 8 He concluded that they were not, and, therefore, do not violate the First Amendment.

He pointed out that many of our

criminal laws have their root in religious teachings (bigamy, murder, etc.)
but that doesn't make them Establishmento He affirmed the Everson rules regarding

Establlshment, 9 distinguished the instant case from McCollum (the only case

up to that time in which Establishment was found) in that there is no compulsion to attend church, no direct cooperation or participation by church and
church authorities, and no tax money to aid religion; 10 and concluded that 0 to
say that a state cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes
solely because centuries ago such laws had their genesis in religion would be
giving a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare
rather than one of mere separation of church and state."11 He cautioned, however, that Sunday legislation may violate the Establishment clause if it can be
demonstrated that "its purpose - evidenced either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative effect is to use the States' coercive power to aid religion."12
Frankfurter, joined by Harlan, in a lengthy, comprehensive, detailed concurring opinion, defined the purpose of the two religion clauses of the First
Amendmento The Free Exercise clause serves to protect unpopular creeds, l3
while the Establishment clause is ttto assure that the national legislature

7McGowan, .Q:Q.ci t. , ppo43Q,431.
8Ibid .. , p.431.
9Ibid., p.4430

lOibid., p.452.
11Ibid.,
p.445.
12Ibid.,
p.453.

13Ibid., p.464.
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would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious end; it would
not, ••• make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation .. "14 The Establishment clause and the fundamental separationist concept which it expresses is
not concerned with regulations which have other objectives.15 The state can
reasonably find Sunday a socially desirable day of surcease from subjection to
labor and routine - from this cannot be derived a purpose to establish or promote religion.

Even though another day could be set aside, it would not be as

effective since different members of the family might have different days off,
it would be difficult to enforce, etc.; he thus rejected the contention that
Sabbatarians be given an alternative so that they would not be at a competitive
disadvantage, 16 for, in view of the community interests which mu,st be weighed
in the balance, the disadvantage wrought by non-exempting Sunday statutes is
not an impermissible imposition on the Sabbatarians' freedome
Douglas vehemently disagreed, he would declare the laws unconstitutional
as to those complaining, 17 and added that in the case of the Orthodox Jew, the
vice is accentuated. For Douglas, the question is 0 whether the State can impose criminal sanctions on those who unlike the Christian majority that makes
up our society, worship on a different day or do not share the religious
scruples of the majority." He objected that the Court, once having arrived at
a general benefit and, therefore, no Establishment, dismissed all other objec-

tions as coming within the scope of the legislature's discretion.

In other

words, although there is no Establishment which voids the statute, its application to the Orthodox Jew plaintiff violates his right of Free Exercise since his
religion requires him to maintain another day of rest, and, therefore, is unconstitutional
in its application to him.
'
.

14Ibid., p.465.

15Ibid., p.466.

16Ibid., p.520.

l7Douglas is joined b;y Brennan and Stewart in his dissent in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.So 617, (1961), the case which involved a Kosher meat market and
the Pennsylvania Sunday Closing laws.
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